Composition of the partisan bodies |
1.1. Form of election |
Is there statutory provision for the participation of minority slates in the composition of management bodies, with the adoption of a proportional system? |
The adoption of the proportional principle for elections is more democratic than the majority principle, as it allows minority party currents to participate in decision-making |
Mill (1981 [1861])MILL, John Stuart. Considerações sobre o governo representativo. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1981 [1861].; Alencar (1991 [1868])ALENCAR, José de. O sistema representativo. In: SANTOS, Wanderley Guilherme dos. Dois escritos democráticos de José de Alencar. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da UFRJ, 1991 [1868/1874].; Salgado (2015)SALGADO, Eneida Desiree; PÉREZ HUALDE, Alejandro. A democracia interna dos partidos políticos como premissa da autenticidade democrática. A & C: Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional, v. 15, n. 60, pp. 63-83, abr./jun. 2015.; Nunes (2015)NUNES, Georgia Ferreira Martins. A (i)legitimidade representativa no/do sistema eleitoral proporcional no Brasil: a (des)necessidade de uma reforma política. Dissertação. Mestrado em Direito. Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2015. ; Coller and Cordero (2018). |
1.2. Requirements for candidacy |
Is there a statutory provision for the possibility of any affiliate presenting herself as a candidate for internal bodies (with the exception of the requirement of compliance with financial obligations)? |
Broad access to party positions, without the need for extended time for party affiliation or support, is more democratic in view of the potential universality of passive suffrage. |
Gallo (2005)GALLO, Adriana. La democracia interna en el ámbito partidario. Un estudio comparado en partidos latinoamericanos. Reflexión política, pp. 26-39, 2005.; Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.; Coller and Cordero (2018) |
1.3. Minority rights |
Is there provision for the necessary participation of minorities (women, blacks, young people, indigenous people) in the composition of partisan bodies? |
The introduction of historically and culturally subaltern groups into partisan bodies through an express and effective choice of statutes composes a pluralistic characterization of democracy |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.; Coller and Cordero (2018) |
1.4. Term of office |
Is the term of office of managers defined in the bylaws as four years or less? |
The term of office of up to 4 years is considered democratic by analogy with the Brazilian constituent option for this period |
|
1.5. Possibility of re-election |
Is there a statutory ban on re-election of officers? |
Re-election slows down the alternation of power, an essential element of democracy |
|
1.6. Possibility of interruption of term of office |
Is there a statutory provision for removing officers from office before the end of their term of office? |
The provision for cases of dismissal of officers before the end of the term of office prevents the possibility of abusive exercise of power by the officers. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.
|
1.7. Accountability to affiliates |
Do officers have a statutory duty to publicly present to members the accounts of their management and the activities performed? |
Transparency in the exercise of party mandates enables control by affiliates and promotes democracy within parties. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.
|
Conflict resolution system |
2.1. Composition of the responsible body |
Is the body responsible for conflict resolution elected by the members and inclusive of representatives of minorities? |
The choice of affiliates for the members of the body responsible for conflict resolution prevents their training in the interests of the leaders and the integration of representatives of minorities implies greater plurality in decisions. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.
|
2.2. Existence of procedural rules |
Does the statute clearly provide for the procedure for the resolution of conflicts between bodies? |
The express provision of dispute resolution procedures allows the parties to know in advance how they will be resolved and can trigger the statute in case of noncompliance, which avoids the misuse of power by the members of the body. |
|
2.3. Guarantee of adversarial proceedings |
Is there a statutory provision for the contradictory? |
The contradictory and the broad defence are indispensable elements for the configuration of a democratic procedure. |
Gresta (2014)GRESTA, Roberta Maia. Introdução aos fundamentos da processualidade democrática. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2014.
|
2.4. Composition of disciplinary bodies |
Is the body responsible for investigating disciplinary shortcomings elected and composed with the participation of minority representatives? |
The choice of affiliates for members of the body responsible for the determination of disciplinary faults reflects participation and control. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.
|
2.5. Functioning of disciplinary bodies |
Is the body responsible for investigating disciplinary deficiencies permanent and are its procedures provided for in the statute? |
The permanent nature of the body responsible for the investigation of disciplinary deficiencies prevents its formation in accordance with the interest of the leaders and the provision of the procedures guarantees the possibility of activating the statute in case of lack of effectiveness of the rights of defense. |
|
2.6. Classification of punishments |
Are disciplinary faults and their punishments provided for in the statute? |
Given the impact of fundamental rights on private relations and the political parties' monopoly on the submission of candidacies, the existence of punishments without strictly definition is not democratic. |
|
2.7. Comprehensive defense guaranteed |
Do members subjected to disciplinary proceedings have adequate time (3 days or more) to present their defence? |
The period of three days for the defense derives from the usual period for electoral appeals provided for in the Electoral Code (art. 258). |
|
2.8. Possibility of appeals |
Can sanctioned members lodge appeals against their conviction? |
The possibility of giving reasons for non-conformity with the decision given and the right to receive a further assessment of the case are components of democratic processes. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.
|
2.9. Publicity of resolutions |
Are the decisions of conflict resolutions and punishments public? |
Publicising decisions on conflicts and punishments allows affiliates and society to control the contentious procedures of political parties. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.
|
Relationship between the partisan bodies |
3.1. Decentralization of the party |
Do partisan state and local agencies have decision-making power over coalitions, distribution of resources, and selection of candidates? |
The decentralization of decisions - despite the national character of political parties determined by the Constitution - corresponds to a democratic ideal of participation and control. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.: Coller and Cordero (2018) |
3.2. Decentralisation of resources |
Is there provision for the allocation of public resources to state and local bodies? |
The existence of resources guaranteed to local bodies preserves their capacity for action and makes the decentralization of power more effective. |
|
3.3. Overcoming local decisions |
Are there express statutory provisions for the replacement or removal of decisions taken by local bodies by national bodies? |
The faculty for local authorities to take decisions is enhanced by expressly providing the possibility of overlapping a local decision by a resolution of the national body. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.
|
3.4. Dissolution of directories |
Is there a statutory ban on the dissolution of state and local directories by national agencies? |
Another relevant development for the guarantee of party decentralization is the impossibility of dissolving subnational directories. |
Berge, Poguntke, Obert and Tipei (2013)BERGE, Benjamin von dem; POGUNTKE, Thomas; OBERT, Peter; TIPEI, Diana. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 2013.
|
3.5. Provisional committees |
Is there a statutory ban on nationally appointed provisional commissions that may exist for more than six months? |
The provisional commissions, freely appointed and removed, do not allow the participation and control of the action of the leaders, having a clear anti-democratic character. |
|