Does Campaign Donation Results Future Contracts Returns? An Analysis about Contractual Values Received to Companies before and after Elections

Abstract

This paper aims to investigate whether the companies that carry out donations to the federal government coalition parties receive higher contract values, before or after the elections. From 2006 campaign donations on the Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE) data and contractual amounts of the Transparency Portal of the Federal Government, it was estimated the minimum effect to donate to the coalition members on contractual amounts. Although the estimators contain selection bias due to missed and unobserved variables, the bias expectation is positive due to a positive correlation between the dependent variable and treatment, on one hand, and between treatment and omitted variables on the other. This means it is possible to estimate the minimal effect of giveaway to the coalition on contractual returns. The effect on contractual returns after the elections is very low, but the contractual amounts received by companies before the elections are associated with donations expressively. In addition, it is not possible to state that the Chief Executive Party donors receive major contracts in relation to the opposition financiers. In short, if there is a pact between businesses and members of the coalition, the agreements are established and fulfilled before the elections.

KEYWORDS:
electoral financing; elections; coalition government; electoral campaigns; government procurement