This article examines how the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) makes its decisions. We look specifically at the groups that emerge as judges set out to decide cases. Part of the literature that deals with the issue we address here has argued that there is a high level of personalism in Supreme Court judging, indicating that the court works more as a sum of individual votes than as a collegiate body. This is verified when we look at some of the single cases that have had the greatest repercussion. Yet does this also hold true when we look at a large volume of decisions and analyze them as a whole? In order to answer this question, we follow the path laid out by authors who raise questions as to whether the Supreme Court acts as a cohesive collegiate body, yet assert that, rather than a sum of individual votes, it should be seen as coming together around temporary alliances and exclusive ingroups or "cliques" formed in accordance with the president's nominations. This argument is tested through empirical analysis of the 1 277 Direct Unconstitutionality Suits judged by the Supreme Court between 1999 and 2006. Our major conclusion is that judges who have been nominated by the same president show more propensity to vote as a group that to split up their vote, and that the cohesion demonstrated by the judges who have been named by the same president is greater than the cohesion among members of the court in general. During the period we analyze, beyond coalitions, we were also able to identify two "cliques", one made up of judges named during the military regime and aligned with judges named by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and President Itamar Franco, and the other made up of three judges named by President Lula.
Federal Supreme Court; Decision Making Processes; Voting Networks; Coalitions; Cliques
