ABSTRACT
Introduction:
The article addresses the promotion of municipal state capacities through the Tax Administration Modernization Program (PMAT), implemented by BNDES, between 1997 and 2014. It seeks to analyze how federal programs that promote municipal state capacities, implemented by sub-governments (federal public bureaucracies with reasonable autonomy of action to define their rules), can generate federative dissonance and reduce their possibility of access if they disregard the different municipal realities.
Materials and Methods:
were used quantitative techniques (descriptive statistics generated from the PMAT municipal adhesion reports and a Websurvey with the city halls) and qualitative techniques (interviews with federal managers - BNDES, Ministry of Finance and Caixa Econômica Federal - and political and technical leaderships of the National Confederation of Municipalities, Brazilian Association of Municipalities and National Front of Mayors. The theoretical argument is that dissonances between the federal agencies that provide programs and the municipalities as recipients produce low performance in terms of adhesion.
Results:
the research showed how games of federative cooperation can result in contrasting views between feds and locals. Empirically, this discussion was based on the implementation of the PMAT and how the explanatory mechanism of federative dissonance allows us to understand the relationship between “donor” and “recipient” in the midst of intergovernmental relations. The result of federative cooperation was the opposite of what its most benign view advocated as it encouraged more defensive actions by municipalities that weighed the costs and benefits of accessing the PMAT.
Discussion:
given the institutional design of the PMAT, considering the combination of the requirements for municipal entry and the fact that the applications are voluntary, the inducements favored the largest municipalities. Asymmetry of access was generated, which favored the most affluent cities. The federative dissonance between the BNDES and the municipalities is what explains the reality of the adhesions and the mismatch between the feds and the locals. With their format, rules of induction and disagreements over their operation, in federal terms, programs with these characteristics have little chance of being successful as a means of access for the vast majority of cities. The article contributes to the knowledge about the design of federal programs and their rules of access by subnational entities, especially those to promote municipal state capacities. Another contribution is that the way in which feds design and implement programs influences the type of municipal membership. The action of subgovernments can generate views that do not coincide between federal managers and the municipal reality. This is another contribution to the literature on federalism and state capacities of local governments.
Keywords
state capacities; PMAT; federative dissonance; municipalities; intergovernmental cooperation