

Antipartisanship and political tolerance in Brazil

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ABSTRACT Introduction: This article propose to connect two research agendas on political behavior: studies on political tolerance and research on partisanship. Search, by connecting these two agendas, to assess the extent to which parties have become targets of political intolerance and thereby to assess the intensity of negative attitudes towards this central institution of democracy. Studies on partisanship conflicts in Brazil have focused on the antagonism opposing *petismo* and *antipetismo*. However, the 2018 elections have shown that Brazilians also adopt other forms of antipartisanship. Changes in patterns of political and electoral behavior in recent years can only be properly understood if we consider variation over time in the intensity and scope of antipartisan sentiment. We propose a typology where antipartisanship may be moderate or radical and may have a narrower or broader target. This theme is significant not only for interpreting Brazil's current political context, but also for deepening understanding of theoretical and analytical questions. Our understanding is that these different types of antipartisanship are distinct phenomena with different effects. **Materials and Methods:** The data we use to construct the proposed typology and analyze the range and intensity of antipartisanship are derived from an unprecedented Latin America Public Opinion Project initiative to measure political tolerance in Brazil, in its 2017 edition. Our methodology combine variables of disaffection and political intolerance to construct different voter profiles, based on respondent's attitudes towards unpopular groups, including political parties. After constructing the typology, we propose regression models to estimate the effects of each type on several attitudes, like support to democracy and institutional trust. **Results:** Our findings show a relationship between the most extreme types of antipartisanship and attitudes towards democracy. Compared with non-antipartisan voters, intolerant antipartisan are less supportive of democracy and democratic institutions and less favorable to freedom of expression and the granting of political rights to minorities. The intensity of antipartisanship matters more than its scope, since the models show that, there is little difference in the degree of commitment to democracy and democratic principles between the two types of intolerant antipartisans, regardless of the scope of the target of their disapproval. This means that attitudes toward democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic principles depend less on the scope antipartisanship, than on political intolerance towards these groups. **Discussion:** The data and results presented here indicate that antipartisanship is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. The individual is not merely antipartisan or non-antipartisan. We show that antipartisanship contains at least two dimensions: its scope and intensity. Previous studies have already shown the existence of different expressions of antipartisanship, but this diversity has not yet been systematically explored using a well-defined typology. Our work points to this research agenda.

KEYWORDS: antipartisanship; political tolerance; political attitudes; political parties; democracy.

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I. Introduction

Polarization in Brazilian politics has expanded beyond the bounds of the political elite in the form of demonstrations and protests that, since 2013, have seen hundreds of thousands of people take to the streets. Common at such events have been chants, posters and banners that express intolerant political attitudes. In some cases, such intolerance has manifested in physical violence, even leading to the construction of a security wall to separate groups supportive of and opposed to the government at the time of the votes on the admissibility of the president's impeachment process in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The recent context of a hostile election contest in 2018 accentuated the antagonism between opposing political camps.

This context forces us to think about the effects of political intolerance on Brazil's young democracy, especially on freedom of expression and the coexistence of a plurality of political projects. This article addresses a specific manifestation of this phenomenon: intolerance of political parties in Brazil.

In this sense, we propose to connect two research agendas on political behavior that remain isolated: studies on political tolerance and research on partisanship. On the one hand, investigations by the first group have focused on what we call nonconformist groups (communists, racist, atheists, among others), focusing on how public opinion positions itself regarding their fundamental political rights. To date, this literature has not included among the targets of intolerance political parties' activists. On the other hand, studies of partisanship have used measures of affiliation or feelings that do not tap extreme negative attitudes, as the denial of the political rights for political party and their members. Our intention is, by connecting these two agendas, to assess the extent to which parties have become targets of political intolerance and thereby to assess the intensity of negative feelings or attitudes towards this central institution of democracy.

Studies of conflicts at the level of broad attitudes in Brazil have focused on the antagonism that opposes *petismo* – support of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party, *PT*) – and *antipetismo*, or opposition to the *PT*. However, the 2018 elections have shown that Brazilians also adopt other forms of antipartisanship. Obviously, this does not mean that *antipetismo* has lost relevance. On the contrary, it was one of the main driving forces of the vote and decisive for the electoral result. But the victory of Jair Bolsonaro of the *Partido Social Liberal* (Social Liberal Party, *PSL*), on a far-right ideological platform, can only be adequately explained by a combination of *antipetismo* and rejection of other conventional parties, especially the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (Brazilian Party of Social Democracy, *PSDB*). Moreover, changes in patterns of political and electoral behavior in recent years can only be properly understood if we consider variation over time in the intensity and scope of antipartisan sentiment.

However, little is known about the different expressions of antipartisanship in Brazil, which can range from antipathy to one party to a desire to eliminate all parties from the political system. To fill this lacuna, we propose a typology of antipartisanship and examine the differences between the different types in terms of their attitudinal underpinnings. According to the typology we propose, antipartisanship may be moderate or radical and may have a narrower or broader target. This theme is significant not only for interpreting Brazil's current political context, but also for deepening understanding of theoretical and analytical questions. Our understanding is that these different types of antipartisanship are distinct phenomena with different effects.

Tolerant antipartisanship has been the main focus of national and international literature, with the rejection of parties used as a measure. The most extreme form of antipartisanship, whose most distinctive feature is political intolerance, has not yet been systematically investigated. In our view, radical antipartisanship, whether it has a narrow or broad focus, is one of the main factors driving political conflicts at the level of mass behavior in Brazil today, ultimately leading to Bolsonaro's successful rise to the Presidency of the Republic. Because of its relevance to Brazilian political life and the fact that it has not yet been studied, we primarily focus on this type of antipartisanship.

As already noted, our model distinguishes different types of antipartisanship according to their comprehensiveness. While the few existing studies on the subject in Brazil deal with antipartisanship as rejection of one specific party (the *PT*), our research also considers the broader rejection of parties (Poguntke,

1996; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996; Torcal *et al.*, 2002), which we expect to be correlated with distinctive attitudinal and behavioural patterns.

Another difference between our study and conventional studies of anti-partisanship is that our focus is not on parties as institutions, but on partisans, that is, those identified as supporters of parties. The standard procedure for gauging negative feelings towards parties is to use variables that measure disaffection towards them. There is no doubt that this is a strong predictor of voting behavior. But when the goal is to measure attitudes favorable to the political exclusion of groups, such as those who identify with or are activists for a given party, political tolerance is a more appropriate measure.

This type of antipartisanship, characterized by “us versus them”, has been discussed in studies on group identity. In addition to explaining the vote, this high-intensity antipartisanship that targets partisan groups is more adequate for explaining social mobilization, including public demonstrations and confrontation in the streets. To analyze extreme antipartisanship, we engage with the literature on political tolerance, which has not previously been included in studies of negative partisanship.

The article is structured in five sections, after this introduction (I). In the second part, we present a brief review of the literature on antipartisanship and identify the lacuna that we seek to fill. In the third section, we provide information about the empirical material and methodological procedures of our study, and present a typology for studying antipartisanship in the Brazilian context. In the fourth section we present the results using models to estimate attitudinal effects of antipartisanship, especially in its most extreme version. In section five, we discuss these results, and in our Conclusion (VI), we return to the article’s opening discussion.

II. Party sentiments: partisanship and antipartisanship

As early as 1960, the authors of “The American Voter” (Campbell *et al.*, 1960) argued that, in addition to party identification, a phenomenon related to negative partisanship could also be observed within the electorate. One of the pillars of this foundational work in political behavior studies (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007) lies in the theory of reference groups in social psychology, which had already developed the notion of “negative reference groups, later developed in studies based on social identity theory (Mayer, 2017; Iyengar *et al.*, 2012; McGregor *et al.*, 2015; Medeiros & Noël, 2014; Samuels & Zucco, 2018; Freire *et al.*, 2017).

However, in the dissemination of the results presented by Campbell and his collaborators (Campbell *et al.*, 1960), the role of negative partisanship tended to be overlooked. When the literature addressed negative party sentiment it was in order to explain the different patterns of behavior among supporters vis-à-vis the opposing party (Almond & Verba, 1989), more closely linked to the theme of polarization between partisan voters than antipartisanship per se.

The presumed universality of the theories that “most Americans have an affective bond with a party” (Campbell *et al.*, 1960, p. 121) and that party identification is one of the key factors determining elections only began to be questioned in the 1980s, as political parties and electoral turnouts notably declined (Wattenberg, 1984). If, in studies on party decline, the central question addressed was the growth in voter apathy, the ensuing debate on antipartisanship focused on the formation of negative attitudes toward such institutions.

At least since the 1990s, the concept of antipartisanship has been studied as a phenomenon that is constitutive of political dynamics (Poguntke, 1996; Pogun-

tké & Scarrow, 1996). As a result, in the last twenty years, studies on electoral behavior have consolidated around the view that parties are not only a pole of attraction for voters, but also an object of rejection.

The antipartisanship debate gained prominence when its effects became more visible with the rise of the 'new right' in Europe during the 1990s (Poguntke, 1996). The studies are divided between, on one side, a culturalist approach, focusing on antisystemic attitudes, their causes and consequences (Poguntke, 1996; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996; Torcal *et al.*, 2002) and, on the other, the study of negative partisanship as a new development within the field of partisanship (Mayer, 2017; McGregor *et al.*, 2015; Medeiros & Noël, 2014).

The first approach considers the target of antipartisanship as of parties collectively, whether this denotes actually existing parties or political parties as an institution. This tolerant antipartisanship is a more stable attitude and entails opposition to one of the principles of representative democracy: partisan competition (Dahl, 1997). As a consequence, antipartisanship, especially that which rejects parties per se, can contribute to the emergence of neopopulism, to a decline in support for democratic regimes and to anti-systemic patterns of behavior (Schedler 1996, especially in contexts where political parties have historically been fragile, as is the case in Latin American countries (Yebara, 1998).

Torcal *et al.* (2002) show that, at least in the southern European countries, it is those who are younger, less educated, and politically disaffected (Torcal *et al.*, 2002) that hold more negative attitudes toward parties, constituting what they call cultural antipartisanship. The central argument of the authors is that cultural antipartisanship is part of a broader condition of apathy and political disaffection that leads to broad social sectors becoming detached from politics.

The second approach in the study of antipartisanship lies within the scope of partisanship itself, focusing on individual's aversion to the party opposing that which they identify. This approach is theoretically grounded in social identity theory, according to which negative attitudes towards the opposing group are a constituent element of the group identity itself (McGregor *et al.*, 2015). That is to say, identification with a party is accompanied by rejection of the parties against which it competes.

More concerned with the role of the parties in explaining electoral behavior than with broader attitudes toward the political system and its consequences for democratic regimes, the key concept of these studies is "negative partisanship". Not surprisingly, studies that follow this line understand that the target of negative partisanship is the party for which the individual would never vote (Rose & Mishler, 1998; Medeiros & Noel, 2014; Garry, 2007).

The literature has little to say about different types of antipartisanship. There are few works that elaborate theories and typologies capable of explaining the ways in which the phenomenon varies. As we have seen, studies that follow a more culturalist line divide antipartisans between those who reject "actually existing" parties and those who reject the very existence of parties.

In this tradition of studies on party identification, the tendency is to contrast two types of partisanship: positive and negative. This means that no effort is made in this field to distinguish between different types of antipartisanship. Even models that propose to go beyond a binary typology do not escape this duality. Rose & Mishler (1998), for example, present a more general typology of partisanship, according to which a negative partisan is a voter who has no party identity but who would not, under any circumstances, vote for a particular party. The difference between the negative partisan and partisan voters is that the latter identify with one party, regardless of whether they have a negative identification with another party.

In Brazil, the notion of negative partisanship initially arose in the study of Almeida (1996) and has been further developed in subsequent studies by Carreirão & Kinzo (2004) and Carreirão & Barbeta (2004), Carreirão (2007a; 2007b; 2008), Ribeiro, Carreirão & Borba (2011; 2016), Neves (2012), and Samuels & Zucco (2015). To summarize, these studies argue that the negative attitudes Brazilians hold towards political parties are as important as positive ones, especially in the way they structure voting patterns.

On the other hand, such attitudes bear little relation to the views voters hold on key issues, such as the role of the state in the economy, and their broader political attitudes, such as their commitment to democracy. However, some studies, although confirming the dominant homogeneous pattern of partisan and antipartisan political positions and attitudes, point to the existence of statistically significant differences between *petistas* and *antipetistas* in relation to affirmative action policies (Zucco & Samuels, 2015) and in support of democracy, political tolerance and the desirability of social change (Samuels & Zucco, 2018).

Subsequent works focusing on the polarization debate supported the conclusion that there are few differences between *antipetistas* and *psdbistas* (Borges & Vidigal, 2018), both in terms of ideology and social profile. Following this reasoning, political polarization in Brazil is basically affective in nature (Freire *et al.*, 2017).

In situating negative partisanship in Brazilian within the international literature on antipartisanship, Samuels & Zucco (2018) take an important step towards establishing a model capable of going beyond the *petismo* vs *antipetismo* dualism. According to the authors, the growth of antipartisanship between 1998 to 2016, rising from 15.7 to 23.9%, made Brazil the country with the highest percentage of antipartisans.

The authors consider as antipartisan those voters who have no party identification and reject at least one party. Although the starting point is different, the point of arrival is essentially the same: in Brazil, antipartisanship is practically synonymous with *antipetismo*.

But is antipartisanship in fact concentrated solely the PT? The authors themselves note that in Brazil, only 40% of antipartisans target only one specific party. Furthermore, according to Samuels & Zucco (2018), Brazil is today the country in which antipartisans opposed to just one party represent the smallest percentage of the total number of antipartisans. Similarly, Paiva *et al.* (2016) show that the PT does not stand out as a target of negative partisanship. They identify a level of similar rejection “in relation to the other important parties in the Brazilian political scenario” (Paiva *et al.*, 2016, p. 649). The evidence available to us (Table 1) also shows that antipartisanship in Brazil is diffuse.

One of our aims in this article is to go beyond negative partisanship, which focuses on an individual’s negative disposition towards a party. Although this narrow form of antipartisanship is relevant for explaining the individual’s electoral behavior (s/he probably will not vote for the party in question), it does not help in explaining other phenomena associated with a broader rejection of political parties, such as voters abstaining or spoiling their ballots.

Of equal if not greater importance than the scope of antipartisanship is its intensity. This occurs when party rejection is accompanied by hostility (Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996) and political intolerance. That is, when it is not only a symptom of disaffection, but also of a desire to prevent parties from exercising their political function.

Table 1 - Antipartisanship in Brazil, 2017

Disaffection Groups ¹	%
Non-antipartisans	56.64
<i>Antipetistas</i>	10.70
<i>Antipsdbistas</i>	10.43
<i>Antipetistas + Antipsdbistas</i>	22.22

Source: Lapop, 2017.

¹To create these disaffection groups, we use the following question from LAPOP: Speaking of different groups of people, could you tell how much you like or dislike those listed below. We will now use a scale from 1 to 10, in which 1 means “strongly dislike” and 10 means “strongly like”: a) People who advocate the legalization of abortion; b) People who defend the military regime; c) Communists; d) *Petistas*/PT sympathizers; e) *PSDBistas*/PSDB sympathizers. Using only the last two items of the series, groups were created based on the scale for “*Petistas*/PT sympathizers” and “*PSDBistas*/PSDB sympathizers”, considering the lowest score on the scale. In cases where the respondent assigned the lowest score to more than one group, the tie was resolved by random designation. Additional information is presented in the methodological section.

From what we have seen so far, there is one important gap in the literature on antipartisanship: the possibility that various different types of antipartisanship exist, varying in scope and intensity, has not yet been systematically and empirically examined. Likewise, the consequences of these different types of antipartisanship also have not yet received the attention they deserve. The present article seeks to fill this lacuna, emphasizing the most extreme manifestations of the phenomenon and the attitudes associated with them.

Substantively, our goal is to examine more closely the supposed attitudinal homogeneity among partisans and antipartisans in Brazil. To achieve this, we have expanded the scope of antipartisanship, both in relation to its target, ie. going beyond *antipetismo*, and its nature, going beyond conventional/tolerant antipartisanship. Furthermore, we shift the focus from attitudes towards particular issues to attitudes regarding political institutions and democratic principles.

III. Data, typology and construction of variables

Shifting from the discussion of typologies to the actual measurement of antipartisanship, we see that, similarly, few studies have invested in developing more complex measures. Several measures of antipartisanship have been used, from the direct question of whether respondents feel represented by parties (Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996) to more abstract measures that seek to capture the idea that parties are necessary to democracy (Torcal *et al.*, 2002).

But the most often used indicators are those that measure affective disposition towards or electoral rejection of parties. McGregor and his collaborators (McGregor *et al.*, 2015), for example, combine these two types of measure: 1) degree of affection/disaffection in relation to parties, using a scale going up to 100 points; 2) asking which party the individual would never vote for.

Yerba (1998) also uses a combination of two measures: one on the importance of parties to democracy (part of a series of questions inviting the respondent to assign positive or negative values to a range of institutions), and the other a partisan feeling scale (varying between -1 and 1). An antipartisan is an individual who believes that parties are not indispensable to democracy and attach a low value to parties on the scale of party affection.

None of these conventional measures allows us to capture the full diversity of antipartisanship as a political phenomenon. To move in this direction, we propose a typology based on scope and intensity, two dimensions that cover variations in antipartisanship.

The data we use to construct the proposed typology are derived from an unprecedented LAPOP initiative to measure political tolerance in Brazil, in its 2017 edition. As we will now explain, we propose to combine measures of disaffection and political intolerance to construct different voter profiles, based on respondent's attitudes towards unpopular groups, including political parties. Following the general guidelines proposed by Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982), the LAPOP questionnaire presents this first set of questions in order to identify 'disaffected' respondents:

Speaking of different groups of people, could you tell how much you like or dislike those listed below. We will now use a scale from 1 to 10, in which 1 means "strongly dislike" and 10 means "strongly like".

- a) People who advocate the legalization of abortion
- b) People who defend the military regime
- c) Communists
- d) *Petistas* /PT sympathizers
- e) *PSDBistas* /PSDB sympathizers

Unlike Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982), Lapop did not ask the direct question about which group respondents most disliked. The target group was instead identified based on which received the lowest score on the scale. In cases where the respondent assigned the lowest score to more than one group, the tie was resolved by random designation.¹ Using only the last two items of the series, groups were created based on the scale for "*Petistas*/PT sympathizers" and "*PSDBistas*/PSDB sympathizers".

Next, we created four possible categories based on the combination of these two new dichotomous variables: the non-antipartisans, those who are only *antipetistas*, those who are only *antipsdbistas* and those who reject both parties.

The following LAPOP questionnaire invites respondents to position themselves in relation to the political rights of their least liked groups, using the following question:

Speaking of the group of people you least like ..

On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means "strongly disapprove" and 10 means "strongly approve" ..

- a) How much do you approve of the right of these people to vote?
- b) How much do you approve of the right of these people to speak publicly?
- c) How much do you approve of the right of these people to run for public office?

The individual responses for these three measures were grouped into a Political Tolerance Index (with Cronbach's alpha of 0.85), standardized to vary between 1 and 10. We recoded this index dichotomously, considering those with scores of up to 4, which was the threshold point of the first quartile of the data distribution, as intolerant.

¹ The programming (in R format) of all procedures of recoding and analysis is available at <https://cpcduem.wixsite.com/cpcd-uem>.

² The term “generalized” in our typology refers to the disaffection towards the two main political parties (PT and PSDB) in Brazil at the time, that are included in the questionnaire. In this way, it is an empirical limit of the work, since a more effective measure of “generalized anti-partyism” would involve including the supporters, if not all, at least of the main Brazilian political parties in the question about groups that are objects of disaffection. A more comprehensive measurement of “generalized antipartisanship” would include supporters of other Brazilian parties as well. Unfortunately, other relevant political parties were not included in this question in Lapop’s 2017 questionnaire. So, the term “generalized” in our typology refers to the disaffection towards the groups who identify with the two main political parties (PT and PSDB), having together won all the six elections from 2002 to 2014. Together these two political parties gather 62% of the Brazilians who identify with a party in 2017.

Finally, we combine this dichotomous variable of political tolerance with the previous measure of disapproval of groups linked to parties, generating a classification (Table 2) with the following types²:

- 1) Not antipartisan = does not display disaffection towards any party.
- 2) Tolerant antipartisan = dislikes partisans of one party, but is not intolerant.
- 3) Intolerant antipartisan = dislikes partisans of one party and is intolerant.
- 4) Generalized tolerant antipartisan= dislikes partisans of both parties, but is not intolerant.
- 5) Generalized intolerant antipartisan = dislikes partisans of both parties and is intolerant.

The distribution of these groups within the national sample follows in Table 3.

In this article we test two hypotheses concerning the most extreme profile, that we call “generalized intolerant antipartisan”:

- 1) That generalized intolerant antipartisans hold more negative attitudes towards democracy and its institutions, having less confidence in political institutions, less support for the political system and less support for democracy;
- 2) That generalized intolerant antipartisans are less supportive of democratic principles, specifically the rights of minorities (homosexuals) to run for political office and the right to participate in demonstrations.

Our hypotheses are based on the broader argument that the *type* of antipartisanship matters. The substantive argument is that antipartisanship is not a homogeneous phenomenon and that different types each have their own effects. Since the relationship between the most extreme types of antipartisanship and democratic attitudes has not yet been theorized and tested in studies of political behavior, our hypotheses are grounded in the logical proposition that individu-

Table 2 - Classification axes for Scope vs Intensity

Scope/Intensity	Restricted	Generalized
Tolerant	Tolerant antipartisan	Generalized tolerant antipartisan
Intolerant	Intolerant antipartisan	Generalized intolerantantipartisan

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Table 3 - Distribution of Types of Antipartisanship

Types of Antipartisanship	%
Not antipartisan	56.8
Tolerant antipartisan	14.6
Intolerant antipartisan	6.4
Generalized tolerant antipartisan	13.2
Generalized intolerant antipartisan	9

Source: Lapop, 2017.

als hold broadly consistent attitudes towards democracy. We expect, therefore, that individuals who do not approve of parties enjoying political rights are more likely to express negative attitudes towards democracy and its institutions and to democratic principles when compared to those who are tolerant.

Although the target of intolerance varies according to individuals' ideological profile (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982), when intolerance is associated with the rejection of all parties, we can say that it has no ideological bias and therefore is generalized.

In Brazil, 43% of voters (Table 3) harbor some kind of antipartisan sentiment. Certainly, a phenomenon of this magnitude deserves greater attention in studies of Brazilians' political behavior. In the next section, we offer a contribution to addressing this question. As we have already stated, and outlined in our hypotheses, the main focus of our analysis is on more extreme antipartisans, who not only express disaffection with partisan groups, but also disapprove of these groups having political rights.

IV. Results

We first verified whether there were differences in the socio-demographic profiles of the different antipartisan groups (Appendix, Table 1A). Using five binary logistic models (in which each of the profiles was included as a dependent variable), it was not possible to identify clear distinctive patterns between the groups. Significant results point to individuals in the non-antipartisan profile being older on average than those in the other four profiles. On the other hand, tolerant antipartisans are younger and tolerant antipartisans are distinguished from the others by being mostly male and less educated. Finally, intolerant antipartisans have no attributes that distinguish them from the others. This means that the group we focus on, the intolerant antipartisans, is evenly distributed among all segments of the electorate. This contrasts with the findings of Torcal *et al.* (2002) related to cultural antipartisans in southern European countries, who were generally younger and less educated.

We now turn to the results of multivariate models that estimate the effects of types of antipartisanship on support for democracy and for the political rights of minorities. In the models reported below, the effects of the proposed classification are controlled for by three sociodemographic variables: gender, age group and education. In terms of gender, female is coded as 1. Age group is captured through the division of the sample into three groups: up to 30 years old, from 31 to 50, and over 50. Education is measured in the number of years of formal schooling completed. Two additional controls were also included: congressional evaluation and interest in politics. These two measures have scales of 5 and 4 points, respectively.

Here we test two types of support for democracy: adherence to the regime and political institutions, and support for democratic principles³ (Fuks *et al.*, 2019). To analyze the first dimension, we present three linear models to estimate the effects of the most extreme form of antipartisanship. The first has as its dependent variable a measure of adherence to democracy, constructed on the degree of agreement (with an original scale from 1 to 7, converted to 0 to 10) with the following LAPOP question: "Democracy has some problems, but it is better than any other form of government."

The second model has as its dependent variable an index of support for the political system, constructed by adding together three original LAPOP variables. The first is based on the question, "To what extent do you respect Brazilian political institutions?" The second is built from the question, "How proud are you of living under the Brazilian political system?" Finally, the third mea-

³ Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are included in Appendix, Table 2A.

sure is obtained from the question, “To what extent do you believe people should support the Brazilian political system?” All of these were originally coded on scale from 1 (nothing) to 7 (very), but after adding them together we standardized it to a scale of 0 to 10⁴.

⁴ Cronbach Alpha = 0,68.

In the third model, the response variable is an index of confidence in political institutions, also constructed by adding together three questions asked by LAPOP. The first asks respondents to indicate (as with the previous questions, from 1 to 7) to what extent they trust the national congress, the second one asks the same question about the office of the presidency, and the third, about elections. As in previous measurements, we adjusted the scale of the index to range from 0 to 10.⁵

⁵ Cronbach Alpha = 0,73.

⁶ The marginal effects of the predictors can be seen in the figures in the Appendix (Graph 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A and 5A).

Table 4⁶ presents the findings from our study on antipartisanship, showing that: compared to the other groups, belonging to the generalized intolerant group is associated with lower support for democracy. The non-antipartisan group, for example, registers 1.22 points more on the scale, with a mean of 4.5 and a median of 5. The differential effect is similar (1.17) for tolerant antipartisan group and lower for generalized tolerant antipartisans (0.66). What most stands out is the fact that there is no statistically significant difference between the two most extreme types of antipartisanship, ie. whether political in-

Table 4 - Attitudes towards democracy and political institutions

	Support for Democracy	Support for the Political System	Institutional Confidence
Generalized intolerant antipartisan	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Non-antipartisan	1.22*** (0.249)	1.36*** (0.194)	1.42*** (0.175)
Tolerant antipartisan	1.17*** (0.292)	0.69*** (0.225)	0.64*** (0.205)
Intolerant antipartisan	0.3 (0.35)	0.38 (0.271)	0.52* (0.247)
Generalized tolerant antipartisan	0.66* (0.396)	0.41* (0.229)	0.25 (0.207)
Evaluation of Congress	-0.11 (0.067)	-0.64*** (0.052)	-0.65*** (0.047)
Political Interest	0.35*** (0.074)	0.19*** (0.057)	0.20*** (0.052)
Sex	-0.26* (0.138)	-0.13 (0.106)	-0.20* (0.097)
Age	0.48*** (0.094)	-0.03 (0.072)	-0.01 (0.066)
Education	1.12*** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.016)	-0.06** (0.014)
Intercept	3.69*** (0.447)	6.33*** (0.341)	5.68*** (0.302)
Observations	1404	1405	1405
R2	0.094	0.199	0.245

Source: Lapop, 2017.

Obs.: VIF values below 2.0, according to the values in the Appendix, Table 3A. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

tolerance targets just one party or both parties. Four of the control variables were relevant: being older, more interested in politics, and having more years of schooling raised the score, while being female reduce the score.

The second model in Table 4 presents similar results for the first two groups, with a distinction between non-antipartisan (1.36) and tolerant antipartisans (0.69). In the other two groups, the relationship follows the same pattern as that of support for democracy: there is no difference between the two intolerant types, while the score is 0.41 higher for the generalized tolerant antipartisans. In this model, three controls were relevant: education and evaluation of the congress with a negative effect and political interest, positive.

The last model in the table indicates even greater differences between non-partisan and tolerant antipartisans, on the one hand, and the reference category of generalized intolerant antipartisans, on the other. Non-antipartisans score 1.42 points higher than generalized intolerant antipartisans in terms of institutional confidence, while in the case of tolerant antipartisans, the difference is 0.64 points. The distinction between the intolerant groups becomes statistically significant in this model, with the lower scope exhibiting greater confidence (0.52), while the difference in relation to the generalized tolerant antipartisans disappears. Regarding the controls, this time we identified negative effects of the evaluation of the congress, sex and education. The only measure with a positive effect was interest.

Concerning democratic principles, we constructed two models. The first takes a measure of political tolerance for (homosexual) minorities as a response variable. LAPOP asks respondents to what extent they agree with the right of homosexuals to run for public office, with responses measured on a scale of 1 to 10 points, giving a mean of 6.7 and a median of 8. The second model has as its dependent variable a measure of the respondent's support for the right to participate in political demonstrations or protests, constructed using the answers given (on a scale of 1 to 10) to the following question: "I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you approve or disapprove... Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How strongly do you approve?"

The results presented in Table 5 shows that three categories differ significantly from the reference group. Non-antipartisans are considerably more tolerant, with a score that is .91 higher, but this difference is even greater among the two tolerant antipartisan groups, with scores of 1.23 and 1.78. By contrast, once again there is no statistically significant difference of the intolerant antipartisan compared to the generalized intolerant antipartisans. Among controls, gender, interest and schooling have positive effects, while age has the effect of reducing the scores.

The second model has very similar effects, but with lesser intensity: the differential effect for non-antipartisans drops to 0.70 points; tolerant antipartisans scored 1.11; and generalized tolerant antipartisans scored 1.37. Again, we did not find statistically significant differences between the the two types of intolerant antipartisans. The effects of the control variables go in the same direction as those presented in model 1.

V. Discussion

Our findings show a clear relationship between the most extreme types of antipartisanship and attitudes towards democracy. Compared with non-antipartisan voters, and, more relevant to the purpose of our study, with other types of antipartisans, generalized intolerant antipartisans are less supportive of democracy and democratic institutions and less favorable to freedom of expression

Table 5 - Support for democratic principles

	Political tolerance of homosexuals	Support for the right to participate in demonstrations
Generalized intolerant antipartisans	Ref.	Ref.
Non-antipartisans	0.91** (0.306)	0.70** (0.271)
Tolerant antipartisans	1.23*** (0.362)	1.11*** (0.32)
Intolerant antipartisans	0.23 (0.441)	0.51 (0.387)
Generalized tolerant antipartisans	1.78*** (0.367)	1.37*** (0.324)
Political Interest	0.49*** (0.093)	0.55*** (0.082)
Sex	0.81*** (0.172)	-0.05 (0.152)
Age	-0.29* (0.118)	-0.33** (0.104)
Education	0.13*** (0.025)	0.10*** (0.022)
Intercept	4.29*** (0.452)	5.54*** (0.452)
Observations	1412	1420
R2	0.098	0.095

Source: Lapop, 2017.

Obs.: VIF values below 2.0, according to the values in the Appendix, Table 3A. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

and the granting of political rights to minorities. What is striking is that the intensity of antipartisanship matters more than its scope, since the models show that, broadly speaking, there is little difference in the degree of commitment to democracy and democratic principles between the two types of intolerant antipartisans, regardless of the scope of the target of their disapproval (one or two parties). This means that attitudes toward democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic principles depend less on the scope of the target individual's disapproval of groups who identify with parties, than on political intolerance towards these groups.

The results above are in line with the findings of Torcal *et al.* (2002) on cultural antipartisanship in the Europe, which created conditions for the emergence and electoral growth of neopopulist parties. In the Brazilian case, intolerant antipartisanship seems to have contributed to generating an attitudinal bases favourable to the authoritarian and morally conservative discourse that emerged victorious from the 2018 presidential elections (Fuks, Ribeiro e Borba, 2021; Fuks e Marques, 2020).

The data and results presented here also indicate that antipartisanship (like partisanship) is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. The individual is not merely antipartisan or non-antipartisan. We show that antipartisanship contains at least two dimensions: its scope and intensity. Previous studies have already shown the existence of different expressions of antipartisanship (Poguntke, 1996; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996; Torcal *et al.*, 2002; Rose & Mishler, 1998),

but this diversity has not yet been systematically explored using a well-defined typology. Our work points to the promise of pursuing such a path.

VI. Conclusion

Antipartisanship has been visible in the dynamics of Brazilian political behaviour as a phenomenon that is broader than *antipetismo* alone since at least 2013. Having grown quietly, the rejection of the main Brazilian parties clearly crystallized in the 2018 election, in the form of a presidential candidate who presented himself as an alternative option, against the political parties. In this context, studying antipartisanship, including its different types, causes and developments, is a task that has forced itself onto the agenda of Brazilian political science.

In general, the international and national literature on antipartisanship have thought of it as a one-dimensional phenomenon. Here we have developed the argument that it is in fact multidimensional and that, therefore, the first tasks are to elaborate a typology that captures its diversity and test its validity. Our study confirms that there are, indeed, gains to be made from analyzing antipartisanship as a multidimensional phenomenon, especially in cases where negative feeling towards parties is accompanied by political intolerance. In such cases, we are already talking about a phenomenon different to simple disaffection, which has its own dynamics.

Torcal *et al.* (2002) were correct in stating that, in general, the literature does not distinguish between different types of antipartisanship, each with different causes and consequences. According to the authors, cultural, unlike “reactive”, antipartisanship is an attitude that tends to be stable over time, resulting from long-term processes of socialization and experiences of low-quality democracies and authoritarian regimes over extended periods.

We do not know if and to what extent the nature of the anti-systemic antipartisanship that we examine in this article is reactive or cultural. Is it part of a “general syndrome of apathy”, leading to the distancing of whole social sectors from politics and political elites? Or is it a reaction to the irresponsible behavior of the political elite? What we can say is that, in its extreme versions, antipartisanship leads to some defending the suppression of hard-won rights of liberal democracies, such as freedom of expression and the right for minorities to run for public office, and to the decline of democratic legitimacy, which may have contributed to generating a favorable social environment for far-right political programs, like that on offer in the 2018 Brazilian election.

Future studies may confirm whether there is a relationship between different types of antipartisanship and other dimensions of public opinion and political behavior. As well as fostering anti-systemic attitudes, as we show here, does the broader and more extreme disapproval of parties also provoke violent actions? Can the consensus in the literature about the convergence between right and left, and between *petistas*’ and *antipetistas*’ views on a range of key issues, such as socioeconomic inequality and same-sex marriage, be extended to the different types of antipartisanship? And does tolerant antipartisanship increase the number of abstentions and spoiled ballots? Such questions are part of our future research agenda.

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Antipartidarismo e tolerância política no Brasil

RESUMO Introdução: Este artigo se propõe a articular duas agendas de pesquisa sobre comportamento político: estudos sobre tolerância política e partidarismo. Busca, ao conectar essas duas agendas, avaliar em que medida os partidos se tornaram alvos de intolerância política e, assim, avaliar a intensidade de sentimentos ou atitudes negativas em relação a essas instituições centrais da democracia. Estudos sobre conflitos entre partidários no Brasil têm focado no antagonismo entre petismo e antipetismo. No entanto, as eleições de 2018 mostraram que os brasileiros também adotam outras formas de antipartidarismo. Mudanças nos padrões de comportamento político e eleitoral nos últimos anos só podem ser adequadamente compreendidas se considerarmos a variação ao longo do tempo na intensidade e no escopo do sentimento antipartidário. Propomos uma tipologia onde o antipartidarismo pode ser moderado ou radical e pode ter um alvo mais restrito ou mais amplo. Esse tema é significativo não apenas para interpretar o contexto político atual do Brasil, mas também para aprofundar a compreensão de questões teóricas e analíticas. Nosso entendimento é que esses diferentes tipos de antipartidarismo são fenômenos distintos com efeitos diferentes. **Materiais e métodos:** Os dados que usamos para construir a tipologia proposta e analisar o alcance e a intensidade do antipartidarismo são derivados de uma iniciativa inédita do Projeto de Opinião Pública da América Latina para medir a tolerância política no Brasil, em sua edição de 2017. Nossa metodologia combina variáveis de insatisfação e intolerância política para construir diferentes perfis de eleitores, com base nas atitudes dos entrevistados em relação a grupos impopulares, incluindo partidos políticos. Após a construção da tipologia, propomos modelos de regressão para estimar os efeitos de cada tipo em diversas atitudes, como apoio à democracia e confiança institucional. **Resultados:** Nossos resultados mostram uma relação entre os tipos mais extremos de antipartidarismo e as atitudes em relação à democracia. Em comparação com os eleitores não antipartidários, os antipartidários intolerantes apoiam menos a democracia e as instituições democráticas e são menos favoráveis à liberdade de expressão e à concessão de direitos políticos às minorias. A intensidade do antipartidarismo importa mais do que o seu alcance, pois os modelos mostram que, há pouca diferença no grau de compromisso com a democracia e os princípios democráticos entre os dois tipos de antipartidários intolerantes, independentemente da abrangência do alvo de sua reprovação. Isso significa que as atitudes em relação à democracia, às instituições democráticas e aos princípios democráticos dependem menos da abrangência do alvo da desafeição do que da intolerância política em relação aos grupos. **Discussão:** Os dados e resultados aqui apresentados indicam que o antipartidarismo não é um fenômeno unidimensional. O indivíduo não é apenas antipartidário ou não antipartidário. Mostramos que o antipartidarismo contém pelo menos duas dimensões: seu alcance e intensidade. Estudos anteriores já mostraram a existência de diferentes expressões de antipartidarismo, mas essa diversidade ainda não foi explorada sistematicamente com uma tipologia bem definida. Nosso trabalho aponta para uma agenda de pesquisas a partir dessa temática.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: antipartidarismo; tolerância política; atitudes políticas; partidos políticos; democracia.

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Appendix

Table 1A - Social bases of antipartisan profiles

	Non-antipartisans	Moderate antipartisans	Polarized antipartisans	Generalized antipartisans	Anti-system antipartisans
Sex	-0.17	0.18	-0.22	0.36*	0.21
(0.107)	(0.218)	(0.149)	(0.159)	(0.186)	
Age bracket	0.22**	-0.59***	-0.1	0.01	-0.05
(0.074)	(0.15)	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.127)	
Education	0.01	0.01	0	-0.05*	0.02
(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.026)	
Intercept	-0.72**	3.67***	2.08***	2.22***	2.11***
(0.231)	(0.481)	(0.323)	(0.335)	(0.399)	
Observations	1430	1430	1430	1430	1430

Source: Lapop, 2017.

Nota: *** < 0,000; ** < 0,01; * < 0,05.

Table 2A - Descriptive statistics of dependent variables

	Median	Mean	Min-Max
Support for Democracy	7.14	6.44	1.43/10
Support for the Political System	4.29	4.41	1.43/10
Institutional Confidence	3.22	3.73	1.43/10
Political tolerance of homosexuals	8	6.77	1/10
Support for the right to participate in demonstrations	8	7.01	1/10


Source: Lapop, 2017.

Table 3A - VIF values for predictors

	Support for Democracy		Support for the Political System		Institutional Confidence		Political tolerance of homosexuals		Support for the right to participate in demonstrations	
	VIF	Df	VIF	Df	VIF	Df	VIF	Df	VIF	Df
Antipartisanship	1.12	4	1.12	4	1.08	4	1.06	4	1.06	4
Evaluation of Congress	1.07	1	1.07	1	1.01	1	-	-	1	1
Sex	1.03	1	1.14	1	1.1	1	1.03	1	1.03	1
Age	1.10	1	1.03	1	1.10	1	1.1	1	1.10	1
Education	1.18	1	1.10	1	1.09	1	1.18	1	1.18	1
Political Interest	1.14	1	1.14	1	1.14	1	1.14	1	1.14	1


Source: Lapop, 2017.

Graph 1A - Marginal Effects – Support for Democracy




Source: Lapop, 2017.

Graph 2A - Marginal Effects – Support for the Political System




Source: Lapop, 2017.

Graph 3A - Marginal Effects – Institutional Confidence




Source: Lapop, 2017.

Graph 4A - Marginal Effects – Political tolerance of homosexuals



Source: Lapop, 2017.

Graph 5A - Marginal Effects – Support for the right to participate in demonstrations



Source: Lapop, 2017.