a1 |
Economic demand |
Hospitals actually have requirements for doctors' performance. The third invisible hand inspires doctors. Doctors' work too hard and many doctors need more financial compensation. |
55 |
a2 |
Technological demand |
New technology requires doctors to have plenty of training opportunities. Doctors need one or two unique skills in technology to possess discourse power in the field. Hospitals have incentive mechanisms for new technologies. |
34 |
a3 |
Scientific research demand |
Doctors need clinical records to support their research subjects, so they will make decisions for the purpose of scientific research. The promotion of doctors must be based on scientific research performance. Some doctors with an excellent work are not promoted if they do not have scientific research performance. |
24 |
a4 |
Demand from patients and their families |
Patients have inclinations for new technologies such as cesarean section, and doctors abide by the patients' irrational demands. Patients and their families do not have confidence in conservative treatment, have a limited mental endurance and operations must be done in advance. |
62 |
a5 |
Other demands |
For teaching purposes, doctors deliberately treat patients according to the plan set instead of the requirements of the illness. To save time, doctors did not strictly implement the requirements of the core medical system. |
33 |
a6 |
Opportunity of medical decision-making |
Doctors have many independent decision-making opportunities. Even if patients take part in the decision-making process, doctors make the final decision. Although doctors have to abide by national laws and regulations, they seem to only represent a formality, thus, in practice, doctor make the decisions. |
42 |
a7 |
Restriction on decision-making procedures |
The hospital fully authorizes doctors to make decisions and the control of the process is only a formality. Moral hazard behavior is not restricted by regulations made by the hospital. |
26 |
a8 |
Patients' role in decision making |
Patients have no ability to participate in medical decision-making; Patient participation in decision-making is a mere formality. |
28 |
a9 |
Behavior that causes no harm |
Many moral hazard behaviors are non-invasive and will not cause adverse consequences. |
32 |
a10 |
Behavior independency |
Medical behavior is difficult to be defined individually, and many behaviors are intertwined and equivocal, including patients' individual factors. |
34 |
a11 |
Behavior traceability |
The extent to which specific medical actions can be traced back to the doctor. |
45 |
a12 |
Spot checks on industry supervision |
The frequency and intensity of spot checks on industry supervision, and the probability that the doctor moral hazard behavior will be discovered. |
23 |
a13 |
Spot check on hospital supervision |
The frequency and intensity of spot checks on hospital supervision and the probability that the doctor moral hazard behavior will be discovered. |
55 |
a14 |
Spot check on department supervision |
The frequency and intensity of spot checks on department supervision, and the probability that the doctor moral hazard behavior will be discovered. |
23 |
a15 |
Spot check on medical group supervision |
The frequency and intensity of spot checks on medical groups and the probability that the doctor moral hazard behavior will be discovered. |
45 |
a16 |
Industry penalties |
The rate and intensity of industry penalties, and the fact that doctor moral hazard behaviors are threatened with punishment by the industry. |
32 |
a17 |
Hospital penalties |
The rate and intensity of hospital penalties, and the fact that doctor moral hazard behavior are threatened with punishment by the hospitals. |
23 |
a18 |
Department penalties |
The rate and intensity of department penalties, and the fact that doctor moral hazard behaviors are threatened with punishment by the departments. |
34 |
a19 |
Medical group penalties |
The rate and intensity of medical group penalties, and the fact that doctor moral hazard behaviors are threatened with punishment by the medical groups. |
33 |