Abstract
In this study, we intend to propose some theses on the accountability of public agents based on the assumption of a sociological theory of administrative improbity. The Brazilian reality shows that the disciplinary right was appropriated by the parallel Administration. There is an implicit conformation in the Constitutional Text that cannot be disregarded by the Legislator: the essential core of improbity refers to dishonesty. Law 8,249/92, in its literalness, by admitting culpable improbity, violated the Constitution. In spite of this, the filing of improbity suits by the Public Prosecutor’s Office was not, for the most part, to serve the interests of the parallel Administration. These interests, however, presided over the changes made by Law 14,230/21. In one point they were positive: they prevented the misrepresentation of liability for improbity without the agent being dishonest. On one point they were negative: they prevented jurisdictional accountability for guilt. This point requires re-reading the theme: the culpable action of agents, if not punished within a reasonable period of time in the administrative sphere, can be judicially punished in popular action and public civil action.
Keywords:
Administrative improbity; Dishonesty of public agent; Parallel Administration; Culpable performance; Public civil action; Popular action