This paper examines Larry Laudan's claim that "ever since antiquity critics of epistemic realism have based their skepticism upon a deep-rooted conviction that the fallacy of affirming the consequent is indeed fallacious". It is argued that although the main argument for scientific realism, namely, Hilary Putnam's no-miracle argument, does indeed have a logical structure akin to that fallacy, in certain specific circumstances it embodies a legitimate epistemological intuition, which is relevant for science. A number of anti-realists interpretations and criticisms of the argument are analised, with a view to exposing their weaknesses, showing in which aspects they are insatisfatory or can be rebuted.
Scientific realism; Abduction; No-miracle argument; Pessimistic induction; Hypothetic-deductive method; Empiricism; Larry Laudan; Hilary Putnam; Arthur Fine
