Abstract:
In this paper, I will explore the connections between two salient positions in contemporary epistemology: Performance-based epistemology and pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, paying special attention to Sosa´s theory of knowledge and the arguments put forward by Stanley (2015STANLEY, J. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005.) and Fantl and McGrath (2011FANTL, J. Y MCGRATH, M. Pragmatic Encroachment. En S. Bernecker y D. Pritchard (eds). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge, p. 558-68, 2011.). In the first section, I will review both positions. In the second section, I will try to answer a question that has been barely explored in the literature on virtues: Can a performance-based theory make room for pragmatic encroachment? I will claim that there are at least two ways in which this could occur. In the third section I will take Sosa’s discussion on the topic of pragmatic encroachment found in Judgment and Agency chapter 8, and I will argue that while Sosa’s rejection of pragmatic encroachment forces him to assume unnecessarily deep theoretical problems that are hard to solve, his theory can accommodate pragmatic encroachment in a natural way.
Keywords:
Epistemic competence; Apt belief; Practical context