ABSTRACT:
The hypothesis presented in this article is that pitié, or the “second principle”, which Rousseau claims to have found by “contemplating the first and simplest operations of the human soul”, is not antagonistic to the first principle (amour de soi). I intend to show how the radical dualism of the principles can yield before the evidence of a unity represented by a double movement: rentrer sur soi and self-expansion (which is the expression of compassion). From this point of view, the “second principle” has a complementary status to love of self, and not an opposing one as some interpretations propose. However, this is a complex discussion involving controversies among the interpreters of Rousseau, a discussion which concerns the possible divergence of the concept of compassion in the Discourse on Inequality, Émile, and the Essay on the Origin of Languages, and also involves questions about the date of the writing of the latter work.
KEYWORDS:
Rousseau; Love of self; Compassion