Abstract:
One of the main issues posed by Bergson's philosophy in the field of subjectivity is the distinction between inner and outer consciousness; between an interiority, an inner deep self, and an exteriority, a superficial peripheral self. Even though place is in principle something pertinent only to one of the two poles of the self - namely, that relating to exteriority, extension and space - the discussion about the nature of interiority reconfigures the idea of place in Bergson's thought. This is because insofar as it is duration, the inner self also presents itself as a very particular region of experience and life. In this essay we address the extent and the limits of existence, posited as an effective experience of the individual in the midst of these two extreme, irreducible, and absolutely distinct places. In the same context, we also address the relation between temporality and intentionality.
Keywords:
Interiority; Place; Experience; Subjectivity; Metaphysics