ABSTRACT:
This paper investigates the theological essence of contingent futures. First, it analyses the argument according to which, under certain logical, theological, ontological, and cosmological conditions detected by Leibniz (who reconciles St. Augustine's position with L. Molina's and W. Ockham's), the contingent openness of the future may be compatible with the regime of "pre- determined contingent truths", theologically grounded in the principle of an "optimal future" or a "single true future". However, the examination of contingent futures has also fostered, both for and against Aristotle's position, the development of a many-valued and temporal logic as proposed by J. Łukasiewicz or A. Prior. This logic safeguards the openness of future without the metaphysically expensive cost of adhering to an all-determining theo-logic. It hence follows that the critique of logical determinism seems to be more appropriate to express the post-metaphysical conditions of our present agnostic mentality . In this case, however, the openness of the future would entail a profound redefinition of the very ideas and functions of "God", "matter", "history", and "truth".
KEYWORDS:
Leibniz; contingent futures; theodicy; temporality