Following the interpretative line of Deleuze in Difference and Repetition, the paper shows how, in Aristotle and Plato, the difference is defined from the primacy of identity and how Deleuze breaks it to define the difference itself. The Deleuzian philosophy of difference is composed from an apprehension of difference as positive and immanent virtuality constituent of univocal being. In the same motion, it includes a critique of philosophy that seeks to make the difference subject to the representation, as in Aristotle, in which the difference is subject to the fourfold root of identity, analogy, similarity and opposition. Nevertheless, Deleuze explains the concept of nonbeing without negation from Plato's Sophist as testimony of the power of the difference in subverting the distinction copy-model, where there was a commitment to subordinate it to the powers of identity and similarity.
Difference; Univocal being; Identity; Ideas; Simulacrum
