The aim of this paper is to present the basic elements regarding the modular theory developed by Jerry A. Fodor and some considerations about its main challenges. Fodor's notion of mind modularity, on the one hand, aims at overcoming the methodological and epistemological gaps of associationism and localizationism concerning the explanations of the structure and functioning of the mind; on the other hand, Fodor's notion stands as an opposition to Vygotsky's culturalist posture, since for the latter the higher functions of the mind, such as cognition, are artificial and cultural products. Chomsky's cognitive psychology has converted this "artificial" product into a "natural" one, postulating the existence of innate modules to perform specific cognitive functions. Based on Chomsky's idea, Fodor describes the mind as a group of modules. However, his main contribution to the cognitive sciences is the presentation of the mental architecture in two levels and the affirmation of the existence of central modules that are responsible for the higher cognitive activities such as creativity, reflection or imagination.
cognitive sciences; mental architecture; innatism; modularity