Abstract
Democratic theory presents numerous perspectives on what ensures the authority of collective decisions. Part of the literature argues that the value to justify the legitimacy claim would be moral autonomy, which cannot be violated by substantive criteria subject to reasonable disagreement - that is, a norm would be legitimate if citizens (or their representatives) are the ones responsible for the final decision. On the other hand, studies suggest that the result of democratic procedures should be judged in light of substantive parameters of justice - that is, the morality of democracy lies on an evaluation of outcomes from independent substantive criteria. Hence, this paper presents a way out of this dilemma: from a deliberative perspective, it affirms the mutual presupposition between the value of democracy and fundamental rights. Given the inexorability of a conflict between procedural and substantive requirements for political legitimacy, the article argues that interinstitutional dialogue, rather than the last word, would be a more normatively adequate response to the issue of legitimate authority. The deliberative systems approach incorporates the tension between procedure and substance and presents a well-grounded understanding of the political dynamics surrounding the formulation of norms capable of claiming justification in a democratic society.
Keywords:
Deliberative Democracy; Justice; Legitimacy; Interinstitutional Dialogue; Deliberative Systems