Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Process aspects are prevalent in many domains of reality, and consciousness is no exception. Nevertheless, while the processual approach implicitly underlies the theories of consciousness, an explicit statement of the question is scarcely found in the literature. This paper tries to bridge this gap. Here, I argue that conscious experience fulfils all the requirements for a processual analysis: it is complex, functionally/causally determined, and has a temporal basis. Then, I revisit an old concept, self-transformative processes, which refers to processes that change themselves. These processes are very common. A stretched bow is the classical Heraclitean example. However, it is easy to misunderstand what self-transformativeness is. To provide a well-formed description, I characterize self-transformative processes in terms of composition (using a non-classic mereology) and in terms of functionality (by developing the concept of self-modulating variables). Finally, I apply self-transformative processes to explain consciousness. Traces of self-transformativeness can be found in many theories of consciousness, particularly when they are stressed about their internal mechanisms. Here, I focus on Integrated Information Theory as a paradigmatic example of a mathematically well-described theory, and I demonstrate that quantitative self-transformativeness is a requirement at the very core of the integration of the information.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract According to a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, the causal role of human consciousness in the measuring process is called upon to solve a foundational problem called the “measurement problem.” Traditionally, this interpretation is tied up with the metaphysics of substance dualism. As such, this interpretation of quantum mechanics inherits the dualist’s mind-body problem. Our working hypothesis is that a process-based approach to the consciousness causes collapse interpretation (CCCI) -leaning on Whitehead’s solution to the mind-body problem- offers a better metaphysical understanding of consciousness and its role in interpreting quantum mechanics. This article is the kickoff for such a research program in the metaphysics of science.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract I describe the key features of pure process realism-realism about the processes that are identified by experimental dynamics structured by scientific models-showing that the view meets criteria for scientific realism. I argue that process realism resolves many of the worries of the antirealist, including the problems of idealization, underdetermination, contextuality, multiplicity, and the pessimistic meta-induction. I show this resolution in the context of a contentious model from physics: the Bohr model of the atom. I then generalize from this discussion to a collection of upshots and constraints on process realism as a view, in order to further distinguish it from orthodox, substance-paradigmatic- or thing-realism. Therefore, pure process realism is shown to be a form of realism compatible with empiricism.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract It is often argued that constitution and causation are different kinds of dependence relations. Some have argued for a distinction between constitutive explanation of causal capacities that explain what a system would do in specific situations from causal or etiological explanations that explain why an event such as a change in the property of a system happened. In what follows we argue against the claim that causation and constitution are always distinct metaphysical relations. This paper develops a temporal account of constitution. We call this species of constitution, diachronic constitution. We show how diachronic constitution is a consequence of a common type of causation in the empirical sciences: continuous reciprocal causation, a variety of causal production instantiated in complex dynamical systems. Hence, this paper seeks to establish that constitution does not only resemble causation in certain respects. We argue for the stronger claim that constitution can be analysed in terms of causation understood as production of change. Temporalizing the constitution relation is neither as remarkable nor as problematic as it might initially seem. The idea of diachronic constitution will appear almost inevitable in the context of complex dynamical systems, given local interactions between microscale and macroscale states in such systems.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In this paper we present novel conceptions of identity arising in and motivated by a recently emerged branch of mathematical logic, namely, Homotopy Type theory (HoTT). We consider an established 2013 version of HoTT as well as its more recent generalised version called Directed HoTT or Directed Type theory (DTT), which at the time of writing remains a work in progress. In HoTT, and in particular in DTT, identity is not just a relation but a mathematical structure which admits for an interpretation in terms of Homotopy theory (directed Homotopy theory in the case of DTT), which in its turn is supported by common intuitions concerning identity of material objects through time, change and locomotion. The DDTbased conception of identity presented in the paper is nonsymmetric: here identity is “directed” or has a “sense”. We compare the HoTT-based conceptions of identity with standard theories of identity based on the Classical Predicate calculus, and show how the HoTT-based identity helps to treat traditional logical and philosophical problems related to identity and time. In the concluding part of the paper we explore some ontological implications of the HoTT-based identity and show how HoTT and DTT can serve for designing formal process ontologies. The paper is self-contained and comprises expositions and informal explanations of all relevant philosophical, logical and mathematical contents.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract From the outset of Western philosophy most occidental philosophers held that both existence and knowledge depended on stability - what is genuinely changing does not have a clear essence or identity and is thus not an object for knowledge, nor can it be expressed in language. This is the case even though change touches all areas of life, shaping both the self and world, in subjective experience as well as scientific discoveries. In this contribution I will consider why precisely change is seen as such a vexing problem for knowledge and I will look at what that means for our ability to know a world that is fundamentally characterised by change. In part 1, I discuss how the assumption that change can neither be known nor put into words, led to the development of epistemologies and ontologies that bypass the problem of change by understanding it in terms of its opposite. I will show how this strategy limits our ability to come to terms with concrete reality. In part 2, I point towards possible ways out of this predicament. I will use the Aristotelian tode ti to propose a novel way to encounter change on its own terms.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract There is an ongoing debate in the ontology of action about whether actions are processes, events, relations, or sui generis entities. This paper focuses on the process view, the view that actions are processes. I challenge it in two ways. First, I argue that some actions are not processes because their performance need not be associated with or accompanied by a process. Second, I critically discuss three main arguments that have been advanced to support the process view. My view, the pluralist view, is that process-theorists are right to hold that certain actions are processes, but wrong to maintain that every action is a process: activities are processes, acts are not, and some acts are composed of a process whereas others are not.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract This article presents a challenge concerning the causal efficacy of causal processes, distinct from the much-discussed causal-exclusion problem. The new challenge is to consciousness theories that require conscious processes to involve causation patterned in some specific way. This broad, diverse class includes prominent theories such as the Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace theories and a type of Higher-Order Thought theory. The challenge arises because the causal pattern is not itself required for the effects the processes have on the organism’s other aspects. Hence, the processes’ property of being conscious is dispensable in accounting for those effects. The theories are challenged to show how this does not constitute an operational problem for individual organisms or a problem as regards explaining the evolution of consciousness. The paper explains how the challenge can be met by the radical move of introducing meta-causation: causation that acts on causation instances themselves. This allows the instances of causation in conscious processes, as entities in their own right, to be causes of effects elsewhere. The paper also summarizes the author’s previously published motivation for proposing meta-causation, as the basis of consciousness itself. The present paper further supports this view.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract This paper argues that embryonic development is best understood through the lens of process philosophy rather than traditional substance metaphysics. Drawing on both contemporary developmental biology and process thought, I demonstrate how key phenomena in embryogenesis-including morphogenesis, cellular differentiation, and organismal integration-align naturally with process-philosophical principles. Through critical engagement with major figures in developmental biology and philosophy of biology, including Turing's mathematical theory of morphogenesis and autopoietic approaches to biological organization, I show how persistent difficulties in developmental biology stem from implicit substance-metaphysical assumptions and demonstrate how a process framework better captures the dynamic, relational nature of development. Furthermore, I argue that this perspective provides novel insights into emergence in biological systems while resolving longstanding theoretical difficulties in developmental biology. This theoretical framework has important implications for both biological understanding and experimental practice.

Resumo em Inglês:

Foreword The reasons that encouraged me to propose a Special Issue for Manuscrito on processual thought in the philosophical-scientific perimeter are primarily rooted in the naturalist spirit intrinsic to process models. The appeal these models have had on my academic and research journey stems largely from their emphasis on the dynamism and relationality of entities, their mutual interdependence, and their contingency, which simultaneously allows for avoiding both reductionist and/or foundationalist approaches and those uncomfortable dualistic fragmentations or “bifurcations” of nature, as Whitehead (1920) would put it. Furthermore, in my view, processual thought revives the original core of the philosophical and scientific approach to understanding natural reality, which is essentially transient, transformative, and evolutionary.1 Today, this kind of theoretical model plays an important role in the ongoing debate across many scientific disciplines, from physics (Rovelli, 2016) to biology (Dupré, 2012; Landa et al., 2024), chemistry (Stein, 2004; Córdoba et al., 2024), and cognitive and psychological sciences (Bickhard, 2024), to name just a few examples. In short, the processual approach is increasingly recognized as a capable and suitable conceptual framework for describing complex and inherently dynamic, interactive natural phenomena. For these reasons, together with the entire Editorial Board of Manuscrito, and in collaboration with all the authors who participated in the Call for Papers for this Special Issue, as well as all the reviewers involved- to whom I extend my heartfelt thanks and my apologies for my inexperience and any mistakes-we aimed to offer a modest contribution to the processual philosophical-scientific thought. The following thematic introduction is intended to offer some general coordinates, to provide the interested scholar with the conceptual framework necessary for a proper understanding of the contributions in this volume.2

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Process metaphysics is both internally coherent and coherent with what we know about the basic ‘what there is’ of the world, whereas a particle-as-particular metaphysics is neither. One consequence of a process metaphysics is that metaphysical emergence becomes explicable, and, in turn, normative emergence. This point is developed with models of the emergence of normative function and of representation. These are steps toward an integrated naturalistic understanding of the world.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In the literature, there are several claims about the centrality of a pro- cess ontology. It has often proved difficult, however, to understand what a process is supposed to be, and what the central difference to thing-based ontologies amounts to. It would be useful to see what an abstract account of this difference consists in. This paper provides a sketch of what logic we should use for a process-based ontology, and argues that intuitionistic logic, and smooth infinitesimal analysis, provide a useful basis for process ontology. A brief sketch of probability for processes is made.