Sumário
Manuscrito, Volume: 47, Número: 2, Publicado: 2024Manuscrito, Volume: 47, Número: 2, Publicado: 2024
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Original Articles A DEFENSE OF LEIBNIZ’S MAIN DEFINITION OF COMPLETE CONCEPTS SCARAMAL, ELLIOT Resumo em Inglês: Abstract In the present paper, I intend to show the role in Leibniz’s overall philosophy of his definition of a complete notion as a concept that contains every predicate of a certain subject. I will try to argue that this definition consists in an exoteric and more intuitive or accessible device directed to those unfamiliar with the intricacies of his views on logic and also that it plays a pedagogical role in his writings. In addition, I intend to explain away the seeming mismatch between this definition and that of individual substance, as well as Leibniz’s definitions of truth and proposition based on the relation of concept containment. In doing so, I will try to show that the definition above of a complete notion provides an important argument for the existence of such notions based on our ordinary talk about individuals and also how my proposal deals with Donald Rutherford’s problem of this definition’s extensional correctness vis-a-vis accidents. |
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Original Articles HISTORICAL THEORY OF REFERENCE AND THE CRITERIA OF IDENTITY: The Clash of Kripke's and Linnebo's Theories of Reference TOY, TOLGAHAN Resumo em Inglês: Abstract In his development of an ontology for mathematics in line with Fregean abstractionism, Øystein Linnebo proposes criteria of identity as a mechanism for reference. This proposed mechanism appears to conflict with Saul Kripke's historical theory of names. However, Linnebo, distinguishing between semantic and metasemantic domains, asserts that no real conflict exists; while Kripke's theory is semantic, his is metasemantic. This paper posits a counter-argument, contending that Linnebo's account, contrary to his claim, indeed conflicts with Kripke's historical theory of names. The paper underscores that, in Kripke's framework, the reference relation transcends the individual, inhabiting a social domain. |
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Original Articles CATEGORIZING INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY ACCOUNTS: A taxonomic approach to the debate BOTTI, IAN Resumo em Inglês: Abstract The objective of this article is to introduce the debate regarding how to organize the competing definitions of intellectual humility. Some of the main accounts will be presented, but the focus will be on the categorizations of these conceptions, i.e., the ways to organize them. Two categorizations will be examined: the epistemic categorization and the dispositional categorization. I will offer a detailed examination of both, clarifying their differences and highlighting their relevance to understanding intellectual humility. Furthermore, I will explore how these categorizations relate to key topics in the ongoing debates surrounding the analyses. I will suggest four criteria for evaluating the categorizations and apply them to the discussion about how to categorize intellectual humility accounts, arguing that the epistemic categorization is superior to the dispositional categorization. In doing so, I also emphasize the relevance of these taxonomic matters to the first order philosophical debate concerning the definition of intellectual humility. |
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Book Review ASAY, J. Truthmaking. (Cambridge University Press, 2023, pp. 76). VALVASSORI, RENATO SEMANIUC Resumo em Inglês: Abstract Truthmaking (2023), by Jamin Asay, is part of the “Elements in Metaphysics” series, published by the Cambridge University Press. The book is an excellent brief introduction to truthmaking theory: accessible, clear, and enjoyable, covering the most fundamental problems of the field. One of the highlights of the book is the chapter on truthmakers for truths concerning social constructions. It successfully shows that truthmaking theory is not only related to abstract metaphysical problems but is also tied to central puzzles in ethics and political philosophy (more specifically philosophies of race and gender). |
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Erratum ERRATUM |
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