A fertile social criticism must also question whether the actions or social conditions that initially cause only diffuse feelings of discomfort or shame should ideally also raise rebellion. One of the most fruitful theoretical proposals for dealing with this task is Axel Honneth's theory of recognition, by means of which he intends to replace the Habermasian emphasis on our communicative practices as the foundation of Critical Theory. However, in such innovative approach is exactly Honneth's strong emphasis on individual 'relations-to-self'(as the core of a formal Theory of the Good) that leads him to a misleading interpretation of the main aspects of rebellion that are able to bring on advancements. In this article, I analyze more precisely the contribution that the idea of a successful 'relation-to-self'(as a supposed telos) performs within the theory of recognition, though pointing out its limitations.
Theory of recognition; Relation-to-self; Social rebellion; Axel Honneth