Abstract
The university has become a central target of neoconservative policies and discourses associated with the New Right in contemporary international politics, exemplified by leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Donald Trump, and Jair Bolsonaro. This article employs Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the conditions that enabled the resurgence of neoconservatism in discourses and policies directed at higher education in Brazil prior to the Bolsonaro administration. Focusing on the government program Uma Ponte para o Futuro (A Bridge to the Future), it argues that Michel Temer’s administration (2016-2018) advanced a neoconservative policy of reprivatization. This approach, while more subtle, instrumentalizes neoliberal austerity to restrict the presence of identity-based policies and debates in the public sphere. The article further argues that, despite its relative subtlety, this project cannot be understood as local or isolated, but rather as part of the emergence of global discursive networks that challenge the role of the university and its contribution to knowledge production.
Key words
neoliberalism; neoconservatism; financialization; university; higher education
Resumo
A universidade tornou-se um alvo central das políticas e discursos neoconservadores associados à Nova Direita na política internacional contemporânea, exemplificados por líderes como Viktor Orbán, Donald Trump e Jair Bolsonaro. Este artigo utiliza a Análise Crítica do Discurso para examinar as condições que possibilitaram o ressurgimento do neoconservadorismo nos discursos e nas políticas voltadas ao ensino superior no Brasil antes da administração Bolsonaro. Com foco no programa de governo Uma Ponte para o Futuro, argumenta-se que o governo de Michel Temer promoveu uma política neoconservadora de reprivatização. Essa abordagem, embora mais sutil, instrumentaliza a austeridade neoliberal para restringir a presença de políticas e debates identitários na esfera pública. O artigo sustenta ainda que, apesar de sua relativa sutileza, esse projeto não pode ser compreendido como um fenômeno local ou isolado, mas sim como parte da emergência de redes discursivas globais que contestam o papel da universidade e sua contribuição para a produção do conhecimento.
Palavras-chave
neoliberalismo; neoconservadorismo; financeirização; universidade; ensino superior
Introduction
In 2019, Jair Messias Bolsonaro took office, becoming globally recognized for his discursive alignment with the New Right. His conspiratorial and authoritarian profile, combined with a strong Christian moral framework and a deeply neoliberal economic orientation, has been interpreted by authors such as Corsetti (2019) as signaling a return of Brazilian conservatism. The initial composition of his cabinet was markedly conservative, with particular emphasis on Abraham Weintraub as Minister of Education and Damares Alves as Minister of Women, Family and Human Rights. Weintraub pursued an ideological campaign against Brazilian public universities by associating these institutions with drug dealing (Redação Veja 2019).
However, such an agenda for higher education is not exclusive to the Bolsonaro government. Other New Right leaders, such as Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán, have also targeted universities and knowledge production. Although the global context within which Bolsonaro’s educational policies are situated offers important insights into his agenda towards universities, reducing this to a single response proves insufficient in accounting for the specificities of the local context. This article therefore takes a step back to consider that neoconservatism in higher education in Brazil has not re-emerged solely through a top-down process, but also through a process of consolidation reflected in the deepening of local neoliberal policies that preceded the Bolsonaro government.
The former president Michel Temer (2016-2018) took office after 13 years of Workers’ Party (PT) governments: Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). His administration became widely associated with the deepening of neoliberal economic policies, as outlined in his government program ‘Uma Ponte para o Futuro’ (A Bridge to the Future), initiating an era of austerity in social policies that continued under the subsequent administration. This sense of continuity becomes more evident in an interview the former president gave on the television program ‘Roda Viva’ in 2021, broadcast by TV Cultura, in which he was questioned by the journalist Paulo Celso Pereira: ‘You praised the Bolsonaro government, stating that it had at least one positive aspect, namely continuing everything your government had been doing. Following that, I would like to ask two questions. Do you regret your vote in 2018 elections?’ (Roda Viva 2021). To which the former president responded:
I do not regret my vote; I never regret what I do. At that moment, when I voted, I was indeed led to do so. As you rightly recalled, I vote for those who have never said bad things about me, and I must acknowledge one point: a former president ought to exercise a certain degree of discretion, in my view. And, indeed, the current government, as I see it, has never said bad things about my administration; in fact, it has continued this work. We reduced interest rates and inflation, and they have continued to reduce interest rates and inflation. (…) In any case, I must say that the pension reform, for example, among all the reforms we carried out, was one that we started during our administration; we persuaded Congress and the population that the pension reform was indispensable and unavoidable. Subsequently, the (current) government continued along this path, maintaining several measures started during our administration (Roda Viva 2021, emphasis added).
Against this background, this paper seeks to understand how the government program ‘Uma Ponte para o Futuro’ contributes to the discursive network of global neoconservatism shaping higher education over the past decade. I argue that the conditions that enabled Bolsonaro’s conservative policies have both local and global drivers, which often overlap and interact. With regard to the local political context, I highlight the government of Michel Temer (2016-2018), in particular his neoliberal economic project expressed in the Manifesto ‘Uma Ponte para o Futuro’ (FUG 2015). According to Apple (2000), one of the ways in which conservatism institutionally shapes social rights, particularly education, is through reprivatization policies. The austerity project masks the desire for identity-based issues — such as debates on race and gender — to remain confined to the private sphere. As discussed in the following sections, the Temer government is not the first neoliberal project for the Brazilian university. However, rather than simply framing the Bolsonaro government as an extension of the political decisions initiated during his administration, Temer is also contemporary with the rise of discourses that transform university politics, within the broader global advance of neoconservative policies.
For this reason, this paper proposes to reflect on the resurgence of neoconservatism in higher education policies1 under the guise of neoliberalism2 in Brazil between 2016 and 2018. I employ the prefix ‘neo’ as a marker of the contemporary condition proposed by Wink (2023), in which neoliberal economic policy and religious morality serve as markers of the internationalized character of the New Right. In this sense, this article does not seek to argue that the social and higher education policies of the Temer government can be fully situated within the framework of the New Right. Rather, it aims to demonstrate how the Temer government contributes to the constitution of the discursive network of global neoconservatism, insofar as its neoliberal reprivatization policies reveal continuities that structure and pave the way for the consolidation of neoconservative agendas, particularly with regard to the university, which were subsequently deepened under the government of Jair Bolsonaro.
In order to reflect on the discursive network within which the Manifesto ‘Uma Ponte para o Futuro’ (2015) is situated, I draw on Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (1995, 2003, 2006, 2012). I select the Manifesto due to its meticulous effort to argue against social spending, framing such expenditure as ‘excessive’ and proposing a radical revision of public accounts, materialized in Constitutional Amendment 95/2016.3 Fairclough (2006) argues that economic discourses circulating on a global scale have the capacity to reshape not only economic practices, but also social identities and imaginaries. Social life is understood as an interconnected practice with semiotic dimensions, in which semiosis is conceived as an irreducible part of material social processes, encompassing all forms of meaning-making, images, body language and language itself (Fairclough 2012: 308). Fairclough employs the concept of ‘texture’ as a sensitive indicator of sociocultural processes, relations and transformations, defining a network of different social practices across various domains of the social field — such as education, the economy and everyday life — and across different scales, from the local to the regional and the global (Fairclough 1995: 4-5).
This article is structured into five sections. Following the introduction, I present the contemporary global landscape of New Right discourses, in which the university has assumed an increasingly prominent role. In order to add texture to the analysis, the following section contextualizes the political processes that enabled Temer’s rise to the presidency. In this same section, I also present a Critical Discourse Analysis of the Manifesto. Given that CDA does not end with textual analysis. After establishing the Manifesto as a discursive starting point that precedes the Temer government, the subsequent section examines how the boundaries between neo-developmentalism, neoliberalism and neoconservatism become blurred and at times overlap in the Brazilian context, highlighting policies that engage with reprivatization.
Fairclough (2012) argues that, beyond attributing texture to the text (discourse) and understanding the context in which it operates, we must also consider its reception. From this reception, new texts may be produced, including both discourses of approval and resistance. In this sense, the fourth section presents the reception of the text as a second stage of CDA, in which both the analyzed text and the new discourses generated from it are incorporated into the analysis. Accordingly, I present both oppositional discourses as biopolitical forms of resistance, as well as new reprivatization discourses that align with and advance the same direction as the Manifesto. Finally, I offer concluding remarks that highlight the discursive network within which the Manifesto is situated, as well as its role in consolidating the conditions of possibility for the emergence of deeply neoconservative discourses on the university, which threaten its diversity and academic freedom.
The Last Decade and the Centrality of the University in Global Political Discourse
In 2017, Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, moved to shut down the Central European University (CEU). Following years of conflict with the philanthropist and university funder George Soros, the CEU came to be framed in Orbán’s discourse as a threat associated with multiculturalism, which led to the closure of its Hungarian operations (Coughlan 2017). In the following year, the Prime Minister intensified his intervention in higher education institutions by banning gender studies across Hungary’s university system (Kent 2018). India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has also been marked by actions targeting academics and university students. In 2019, Modi authorized a violent response against students at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), who were protesting against his decision to restrict Indian citizenship to Muslims (Chakraborty 2020). In addition to strong police repression, punitive measures against the university have continued through austerity policies, as reflected in the reduction of the JNU budget from Rs 37.34 crore in 2014 to Rs 20.30 crore in 2023 (NH Political Bureau 2024).
The former Minister of Education under the Bolsonaro administration, Abraham Weintraub, announced in 2019 funding cuts for universities that failed to meet expected academic standards and that, in his words, promoted ‘disorder’. The minister also claimed that drug dealing took place within universities, referring to them as ‘cracklands’ (Redação Veja 2019). This statement echoes the discourse of one of the intellectual figures associated with Bolsonarism, Olavo de Carvalho, who characterized universities as being controlled by communism and, in his lectures, portrayed these institutions as sites of drug dealing and clandestine swingers’ clubs (Wink 2023: 182-184). Bolsonaro, in turn, began to publicly question university autonomy, framing it as a pretext for corruption. The discourses mobilized during the presidential campaign took shape once in office. Under the Bolsonaro administration, several measures contributed to a broader backsliding of university autonomy. I highlight here Federal Police operations, such as ‘Operação Ouvidos Moucos’ (Operation Deaf Ears), which investigated university rectors allegedly involved in the misappropriation of public funds, as well as attempts by the federal government to circumvent the outcome of shortlist-based elections in the selection of rectors at federal universities4 (Trevisol and Garmus 2024). Although Jair Bolsonaro is currently under house arrest and barred from running for office, his political project continues through his sons. In launching his presidential candidacy for the 2026 elections, Flávio Bolsonaro outlined his project for universities and higher education, proposing that federal universities be removed from the remit of the Ministry of Education and transferred to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation. Through this reorganisation, he suggests that research and technology production, which in Brazil take place predominantly within public universities, should prioritise “productive impact” and align more closely with market demands (Oliveira 2026).
During his first administration, Donald Trump maintained a more subdued neoconservative educational agenda, favoring reprivatization policies (Dias 2016). With the beginning of his second term in 2025, in addition to announcing his intention to dismantle the Department of Education, the president intensified moral interventions targeting the university, particularly against Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) policies. Trump authorized the detention and visa revocation of international students who protested against the State of Israel and announced plans to launch investigations into diversity policies at universities in the state of California (Sainato 2025). Within a short period, Trump extended these measures to Harvard, first accusing the university of antisemitism, threatening to cut USD 3 billion in funding, and subsequently denying the institution the ability to enroll international students (Redação G1 2025). In 2024, Argentina’s president, Javier Milei, announced budget cuts to universities, also justified by a fiscal crisis, effectively rendering the University of Buenos Aires unable to operate within a matter of months. The announcement triggered student protests involving approximately 800,000 people, leading the president to backtrack from his decision (Castro 2024).
According to Abrahamsen et al. (2024), the New Right is characterized by imperial globality. Within these emerging structures of contemporary global politics, there is not only interconnectivity; rather, the global is partially constituted through the national and the local. This understanding of interconnectivity transcends the pre-defined boundaries of the state, the nation and society, giving rise to fluid interactions between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ (Abrahamsen 2024: 12). Building on the concept of imperial globality, these discourses can be understood as constitutive features of a political practice that has become increasingly prominent in international politics with the rise of the New Right. While these are locally sustained through discourses and public policies of underfunding and censorship targeting universities, they may also be characterized as forms of state anti-intellectualism (Fassin 2024)
Although anti-intellectualism is often characterized as a state-level policy,5 Fassin (2024) points to the existence of transnational connections between similar agendas that increasingly converge in calls for a return to common sense and a rejection of science. This form of state anti-intellectualism adopts an oppositional stance towards critical race and gender scholarship as a means of countering the supposed ‘anti-Western sentiment of liberal managerialism’. In this regard, Fairclough (2006: 324) suggests that one of the main contributions of CDA lies in the possibility of observing the effects of discourse adaptation in social life. From this perspective, it is possible to identify a series of interventions targeting the university that vary locally but, over the past decade, have become constitutive of an expanding anti-knowledge discursive network reinforcing global neoconservative discourse. The university is generally understood as a local6 institution, embedded within national structures and functions, and is rarely approached as a spatial domain of interest within International Relations.
The relevance of university politics in contemporary International Relations follows multiple and at times contradictory paths. This is evident both in its potential for contestation (Kamola 2019) and the organization of political alternatives (Kamola and Meyerhoff 2009), as well as in the production of scientific knowledge oriented towards the integration of national economies into global value chains (Bernheim and Chauí 2001; 2008). Although, in the contemporary context, universities have become more open to difference, they remain capable of maintaining and reproducing historical hierarchies (Ahmed 2012). In this sense, the university must be understood as an ambiguous and agonistic institution. Safatle (2025) draws attention to how the New Right assigns renewed centrality to university politics by transforming these institutions into sites of contestation. These movements recognize the social significance of such institutions through the deep articulation between universities, social movements and public opinion. In other words, they acknowledge the university’s capacity to mobilize the social imaginary in sensitive matters related to the reproduction of the social order (Safatle 2025: 1).
This is due to the fact that universities do not exist in a political vacuum; they are not detached from the real world, but are both structured by and structuring it, producing and reproducing a plurality of worlds (Kamola 2019: xvi). Although the contemporary rise of the New Right draws attention to the role of the university as an object of study in International Relations, universities have historically held a constitutive role in the formation of the field. This is particularly evident when considering the role of academic knowledge production in mediating processes of meaning-making that, ultimately, structure the field itself. According to Kamola (2019), the university — particularly US universities — can be understood as a local institution with porous boundaries, given its indirect participation in dynamics commonly understood as belonging to the International.7
During the Cold War, for example, universities collaborated with the security apparatus, actively engaging in the production of a worldview in which nation-states operate within an international system centered on the United States (Kamola 2019: 2). This example illustrates how these institutions embody a dual condition within the dynamics of international politics. The university not only produces meanings about what constitutes the global or the International, but is also shaped by the need to respond to specific political demands of states. Another example can be found in the expansion and large-scale investment in higher education in the post-Second World War period, when departments aligned with strategic interests were required to produce knowledge to address the challenges of the Cold War (Kamola 2019: 2). This dual condition reveals the porous nature of the boundaries between the International and the university’s supposed local condition.
That said, although the New Right draws attention to the relevance of university politics for International Relations, this article argues that the conditions enabling the resurgence of this discourse in Brazil are multiple and precede Jair Bolsonaro. Although it is more pronounced under Bolsonaro than under his predecessor, this article shows that the resurgence of neoconservative discourse targeting the university can be traced back to the reprivatization8 policies implemented during the Temer administration (2016-2018). The Temer administration coincides with an intensification of discourses attacking universities, situated within the broader global advance of neoconservative policies. Moreover, his administration not only unfolds within the same conjuncture, but the former president himself has stated that Bolsonaro’s government continued the policies pursued during his mandate. For these reasons, this article returns to the recent past in order to further complexify the understanding of the political conditions that have enabled the advance of neoconservative discourse on the Brazilian university over the past decade.
The Context Behind the Manifesto and the Government Program ‘Uma Ponte para o Futuro’
In 2011, Dilma Rousseff became Brazil’s first female president. Her rise to power unfolded amid the prevailing optimism generated by the achievements and popularity of the Lula administration, with an early commitment to neo-developmentalism9 (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018: 6204-6205). Although Lula came to power as a prominent trade union leader, his economic policies managed the neoliberal economic model with only marginal adjustments (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018: 167-168). During this period, the global commodities boom enabled financial growth in Brazil, facilitating increased investment in social policies and expanding purchasing power, particularly among lower-income groups (Cocco and Cava 2018). According to Mulatinho (2016: 217), one of the strategies through which neo-developmentalism seeks to distance itself from neoliberalism is through social inclusion driven by economic development and the potential expansion of social rights. Thus, although these governments are often situated within Latin America’s ‘pink tide,’ they did not constitute a break from market-oriented logic or from development expectations shaped by the IMF and the World Bank. PT governance draws on a Keynesian lexicon associated with an expanded notion of life value, adapting to market demands through the logic of the ‘enterprise-society’ (Cocco and Cava 2018: 81).
Dilma faced significant political and economic challenges shortly after her re-election, as the economy began to slow down, particularly from 2012 onwards. This led to a shift in her economic policy, with the adoption of pro-cyclical, contractionary and austerity-oriented measures (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018). These policies emerged in response to the impact of the global economic crisis on the Brazilian economy, which exacerbated inequalities and slowed economic growth (Hoffmann and Guilherme 2021: 201). In this context, unemployment rose, corruption scandals increasingly implicated the PT, and Dilma’s popularity declined sharply amid pressure from the mainstream media (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018: 283-285). Dilma’s impeachment was approved by the Brazilian Congress on 17 April 2016, by 367 votes to 137. She was thus temporarily removed from office, and Michel Temer assumed the presidency on an interim basis (Saad-Filho and Morais 2018: 286).
The Temer government program was introduced as a Manifesto, released on 29 October 2015, resulting from an intellectual effort by the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) and the Ulysses Guimarães Foundation (FUG 2015). I highlight the relevance of this Manifesto, as it was published while Rousseff was still in office, revealing an early impetus to transform Brazilian politics. The Manifesto is framed as an appeal by these two institutions for a more cohesive Brazil, one that would address political inefficiency and the fiscal crisis, outlining a series of structural changes to be implemented by the Brazilian state. In its introduction, the aims underpinning the Manifesto are outlined, including the intention to preserve the economy and develop the state through policies aimed at effectively combating poverty and creating opportunities for all. From the outset, the Manifesto emphasizes the need for social participation in this process, arguing that citizens of ‘good will’ should unite around a shared collective good and political consensus.
In pursuit of this horizon, we propose to seek the unity of Brazilians of good will. The country calls for pacification, as the deepening of divisions and the spread of hatred and resentment are undermining the political consensus without which our crises will become increasingly severe (FUG 2015: 2, emphasis added).
The current fiscal and, above all, economic crisis, with GDP contraction, high inflation, very high interest rates, rising unemployment, a halt in productive investment and a complete absence of prospects, is forcing society to confront its destiny (FUG 2015: 2, emphasis added).
The content of the Manifesto is presented as a shared societal desire, a necessity whose only obstacle, or ‘villain,’ was an inert political system governing the country. Beyond political inefficiency, the fiscal crisis is framed as an additional challenge to be confronted by the nation at any cost. Throughout the Manifesto, the crisis is constructed as a discursive tool that justifies profound social transformations, such as cuts to social spending and constitutional reforms. There is an ongoing process of discursive signification, in which the narrative of fiscal scarcity is linked to excessive social spending. Through this discursive movement, the Manifesto calls for a temporary solution and, gradually, the text comes to present itself as a detailed government program.
At this moment of truth, when nothing less than the future of the nation is at stake, the formation of a political majority is imperative, even if temporary or circumstantial, capable of producing all these decisions within a short period, both in society and in the National Congress. There is no alternative but to seek understanding and cooperation (FUG 2015: 2, emphasis added).
In the passage above, the sense of urgency and the idea that there is no alternative are made explicit. By stating that there is no other path, the Manifesto echoes Margaret Thatcher’s slogan ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA). According to Fairclough (2012: 317), the premise of inevitability is nothing other than global capitalism in its neoliberal form, typically constructed as external, immutable and unquestionable, something to which we must simply conform, particularly if we wish to be counted among developed countries. This discourse articulates an attempt to exhaust the imagination and close off horizons, limiting our capacity to transgress and transform (Schons 2021). By introducing the fiscal dilemma, the Manifesto argues that high economic deficits and a tendency towards indebtedness constitute major obstacles to economic growth. The central discursive approach thus revolves around addressing fiscal imbalance, given its capacity to drive up interest rates, inflation and taxes. The solution that initially appeared as temporary now had to become permanent.
If we do not act quickly, through an adjustment of a permanent nature that ensures a lasting balance of public finances, the crisis will deepen and the economy will find no path to recovery. There is no ideological vision that can alter this situation (FUG 2015: 5).
In another passage, the Manifesto, having previously introduced social spending more broadly, now directly attributes the crisis to the expansion of social programs under previous governments, arguing that income redistribution had reached a point of conflict. Thus, excessive public spending on the social is presented in the text as an issue to be addressed, particularly the constitutional earmarking of expenditure for health and education.
Our crisis is severe and has many causes. To overcome it, a broad legislative effort will be required to remove accumulated distortions and lay the foundations for the effective functioning of the state. This will entail confronting organised and powerful interests, often well represented in the political arena. In recent years, it can be argued that the federal government has overextended itself, whether by creating new social programmes, expanding existing ones, hiring additional public servants, or undertaking investments beyond the state’s fiscal capacity. The current situation could certainly be less critical (FUG 2015: 5, emphasis added).
The public budget, in a society where public expenditure accounts for more than 40% of national income, constitutes the primary arena for distributive conflicts, in which different interests, including the most legitimate ones, compete to secure a larger share of resources (FUG 2015: 8, emphasis added).
To this end, it is first necessary to eliminate existing constitutional earmarks, such as those relating to health and education spending, which were established due to concerns that the Executive might withhold, or even cut, such expenditures when deemed necessary, given that in Brazil the budget is not binding and the Executive may or may not execute the allocated spending (FUG 2015: 9, emphasis added).
Finally, the Manifesto presents a series of recommendations aimed at resolving the severe fiscal crisis. I highlight its main proposals to address the crisis: a constitutional amendment and the creation of a market-oriented economic environment.
We will need to approve laws and constitutional amendments that, while preserving the genuinely civilisational achievements expressed in our legal order, draw on more than 25 years of experience since the promulgation of the Constitution in order to correct its dysfunctions and to reorganise, with greater fairness and rationality, the terms of distributive conflicts arbitrated through legislative processes and government action (FUG 2015: 16, emphasis added).
As highlighted in the World Economic Forum report, our business environment is not conducive and has deteriorated over time. Recreating an economically stimulating environment for the private sector must guide a sound growth policy. All of this presupposes state action. (…) We must enable a more effective and predominant participation of the private sector in the construction and operation of infrastructure, through business models that respect the logic of private economic decision-making (FUG 2015: 17).
In the Manifesto, public spending is presented as the primary driver of the crisis; however, this does not refer to public spending in general. Rather, the focus falls specifically on expenditures related to social rights established under previous governments. As discussed in Mulatinho (2016) and Cocco and Cava (2018), neo-developmentalism continues to operate within a market-oriented framework, making the protection of acquired rights more fragile. Although it creates and expands some social rights, by linking their maintenance to economic growth, it makes them more vulnerable during periods of economic downturn. As economic growth slows, these rights come under scrutiny and their legitimacy may be called into question. Thus, the document frames the constitutional guarantee of public spending on social rights as an inevitable problem: excessive social spending must be restrained.
According to Apple (2000), neoliberalism defines the market as the primary arbiter of social worth, as a means of removing politics and its perceived irrationality from educational and social decision-making. One of the main discursive devices used to justify the changes proposed in the Manifesto is the claim that ‘Brazilian society is still far from the standard of living of families in developed economies’ (FUG 2015: 8). The motivation for changes to the constitutional text revolves around the need to operate on the same foundations as the global market economy, accepting its moderating role and reinforcing the position of the ‘underdeveloped.’ The moderating role attributed to market logic serves the purpose of depoliticizing the social in a neoconservative sense, a process that may unfold through two discursive pathways: oppositional discourse and reprivatization discourse (Apple 2000: 65-66).
According to Apple (2000: 65), oppositional discourses emerge as populations politicize their social needs, resulting from the crystallization of new identities among more vulnerable groups, whether through struggles for affirmative action or against gender-based violence and racism. By contrast, reprivatization discourses arise in response to these oppositional discourses, operating as a form of tension that seeks to push certain identity-based debates back into the private sphere, confining them to the domestic domain (Apple 2000: 66). In this sense, it is important to understand the double meaning that privatization may hold: both as a form of austerity and as a means of confining specific social and political demands to the private sphere. This condition can be further understood through The Sexual Contract (1988) by Carole Pateman. When contract theorists establish the social contract, attributing to men the ideals of freedom, consent, and power, the sexual contract is simultaneously constituted, enabling and structuring relations of domination and hierarchy between men and women. In this way, the dichotomies that stabilize and constitute the state – and modernity – such as self/other and public/private, are reproduced as hierarchies between subjectivities, manifested in gender hierarchies through the dichotomy between men and women.
The subject of political freedom within the social contract is male, while women are positioned as objects of the contract (Pateman 1988: 21). Within these modern dichotomies, gender relations are structured through the hierarchy of men/women, in which women – their histories and trajectories – are confined to the private sphere. By contrast, men, as political subjects, are those expected to construct and govern public life. In The Racial Contract, Charles Mills (1997) demonstrates that, despite its foundational premise of equality among individuals, the social contract does not extend equally to all human beings. Its very genesis is oriented towards specific subjectivities, grounded in a logic of racial domination. The political subject entitled to articulate their demands and political philosophy as universal within the mainstream is, in effect, white.
Conversely, the reflections and intellectual productions of Native Americans, African Americans, and subjects from the ‘Third World’ are not recognized as universal interests (Mills 1997: 4-5). In these terms, cuts to scholarships for quota and low-income students, as well as the appointment of ministers affiliated with parties openly opposed to affirmative action policies, can be understood as responses aligned with a neoconservative reprivatizing agenda. This becomes intelligible as the government advances public policies that suggest that the conditions for accessing higher education should return to the private sphere, rather than being secured through public policy. This, in turn, demonstrates the dual dimensions of reprivatization: not only the privatization of public goods through the economic logic of austerity, but also the operation of mechanisms that confine specific debates to the private sphere.
The excerpts presented in this section reveal how the Manifesto calls for a rethinking of distributive issues, framing the expansion of certain social rights and the actions of previous governments as excessive social spending. In this way, the analysis of the Manifesto points to a discursive orientation towards reprivatization; however, this neoconservative drive is operationalized through austerity policies. The following section returns to the socio-political context that precedes and intersects with the Temer administration in order to examine the close relationship between its neoliberal government program and the process of reification of Brazilian neoconservatism.
Between Neo-developmentalism, Neoliberalism and Latent Neoconservatism
As the first president to emerge from a popular party, Lula’s election can be situated within the context of the ‘pink tide’, commonly understood as the Latin American progressive cycle. However, with the release of the Carta ao Povo Brasileiro (Letter to the Brazilian People) months before the 2002 election, a commitment to market-oriented moderation was already being articulated, pointing to a government that would be less ideological and more pragmatic. Cocco and Cava (2018: 82) draw attention to these two faces of Lulism: on the one hand, Lula was able to establish himself as a direct representative of the subproletariat; on the other, he entered into arrangements with business elites and banks, reflecting a combination of negotiation and reformism. The message conveyed by the Carta ao Povo Brasileiro (Letter to the Brazilian People) was that social policies would not transform the country’s class structure but would instead facilitate the incorporation of a significant segment of the working population into the logic of global financialization (Cocco and Cava 2018).
Lula establishes governability through what Cocco and Cava (2018: 85) describe as a form of ‘Lulismo Selvagem’ (Wild Lulism). Focused on balancing a conservative economic policy inherited from previous governments with a form of social progressivism responsive to market interests, the Lula administration sought to reconcile neoliberalism and neo-developmentalism. That said, although it pursued political arrangements that sustained economic conservatism, PT governments did not place strong emphasis on religious moral issues, in contrast to openly neoconservative administrations such as that of Jair Bolsonaro. In 1998, in an effort to appeal to more conservative and religious segments of the population, including Catholics and evangelicals, Lula declared himself opposed to same-sex marriage and abortion during the campaign; however, these issues were not discursively mobilized during his governments (Folha de São Paulo 1998). In 2006, with the release of the thematic booklet Compromisso com as Mulheres (Commitment to Women’s Rights), Lula committed to working towards the approval of the Maria da Penha Law (Law 11.340/2006) — Brazil’s main legal framework to combat domestic violence — and indicated support for women’s reproductive rights regardless of religious considerations, while not explicitly mentioning abortion (Folha de São Paulo 2006).
The Dilma Rousseff administration, in turn, raised expectations regarding the development of a comprehensive reproductive rights policy, but with limited success. Nevertheless, some public policies in this area were advanced under her leadership, such as Law 12.845/2013, which guarantees, among other provisions, immediate and mandatory care for victims of sexual violence across the Unified Health System (SUS) (Governo Federal 2013). Although these governments did not adopt a structurally combative stance in advancing women’s reproductive rights, neither did they pursue policies that restricted them. By failing to confront the country’s class structure —something evident in their political alliances with parties such as the MDB — this arrangement opened space for a reprivatizing form of neoconservatism. Implemented during the Temer administration, this shift opened the way for challenges to the social advances achieved under previous governments.
Michel Temer, for his part, imposed a strategy of accumulation based on an exclusionary, authoritarian and internationalized form of neoliberalism (Saad-Filho 2020). During his administration, he advanced measures that either deteriorated social conditions or deepened neoliberal policies. As social benefits were tied to economic growth within the neo-developmentalist framework, the discourse of crisis enabled the hollowing out of redistributive and welfare policies enshrined in the constitutional text. The president implemented cuts to social programs such as Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House, My Life), Universidade para Todos (University for All – Prouni10), and Bolsa Família (Family Grant Program) (Hoffmann and Guilherme 2021: 204-205). He also abolished the Ministry of Social Security (whose functions were transferred to the Ministry of Social Development), the Special Secretariat for Women, and the Ministry of Science and Technology (merged with the Ministry of Communications), as well as the Ministry of Culture (Lavinas and Gentil 2020: 12).
The actions taken against social rights during the Temer administration were already prescribed in the Manifesto as a necessary act of citizenship in response to the excesses attributed to previous governments. In this sense, it became discursively necessary to assert that there was no alternative but to frame public investment as something that divides society. Taken together, these measures indicate that his government extends beyond a narrowly austere neoliberal model and is better understood as a form of neoconservatism articulated through a strategy of reprivatization (Apple 2000). In this context, the argument of fiscal balance through austerity measures is mobilized to mask a desire to challenge social gains, particularly those associated with groups whose subjective demands are framed as belonging to the private sphere.
Fairclough’s analytical framework provides a useful lens for examining neoconservatism, as his account of neoliberal discourse highlights how political imaginaries can be transformed beyond purely economic motivations. As argued in Fairclough (2006), the capacity of globalist discourse to reshape political imaginaries resonates with Apple’s (2000) notion of reprivatization as a discursive strategy. For Apple (2000), attacks on discourses of equality are embedded within narratives that promote market competitiveness and oppose the ‘excess of democracy’. Such attacks, however, cannot be reduced solely to the premises of global capitalism, particularly where cultural struggles and struggles over race and gender intersect with class alliances. In this way, the reforms materialize the process of reprivatization by reducing social spending and advancing a political imaginary in which subjects are expected to manage inequalities and their identities within the private sphere. To some extent, by associating social programs from previous governments with harmful economic spending, the Manifesto, among other factors, contributes to the emergence of anti-PT resentment that precedes and extends across the Temer administration and contributes to the election of Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022).
By situating the continuities of neoconservative discourse between the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations within the broader global context of the rise of the New Right, it becomes possible to observe that, although the Temer administration predominantly relied on a so-called ‘rational’ neoliberal discourse, moral issues were not entirely absent from its rhetoric. In this sense, this article adopts the definition of neoconservatism proposed by Wink (2023). The notion of a ‘New Right’ presupposes continuity with an ‘Old Right,’ which, in the Brazilian context, is marked by the persistence of religious morality (Wink 2023). This characteristic is evident in Bolsonaro’s government project, but also appears in Michel Temer’s inaugural speech: ‘What we seek to do now, with Brazil, is a religious act, an act of reconnecting the whole of Brazilian society with the fundamental values of our country’ (Wink 2023: 15). Despite the centrality of religious discourse in Bolsonaro’s administration, Wink (2024) argues that Christian morality was already present in political discourse prior to his presidency, emerging even in moments of lesser prominence, such as Temer’s inaugural speech.
Although religious morality constitutes a shared agenda across the New Right, this movement is not homogeneous, leading Wink (2023) to argue for the existence of ‘plural New Rights.’ The Brazilian right, however, has historically demonstrated a capacity to unify against a ‘common enemy’ in order to preserve social asymmetries; the liberal–conservative fusion,11 for instance, can be traced back to Integralism (Wink 2023: 22). In Brazil, both liberalism and conservatism tend to take reactionary forms, making it difficult to distinguish their respective objectives, as both draw upon hierarchical social structures inherited from the colonial period (Wink 2023: 26). In this sense, the Temer administration and its reprivatization policies created the conditions for an intensification of neoconservative politics, which have constituted the matrix of Brazilian conservatism since before the Republic.
Almeida (2020) emphasizes that conservatism is not a new phenomenon in Brazil, precisely due to the colonial historical conditions of Latin America through which the country developed into a profoundly unequal society. Brazil was constituted based on deep social inequalities: between capital and labor; between men and women, and those who fall outside gender and sexuality binaries; and between white, Black and Indigenous populations (Almeida 2020: 721). Therefore, conservatism remained present even during the so-called ‘progressive governments.’ The use of the prefix ‘neo’ reflects the need to identify new elements of the current historical moment. According to Wink (2023: 123), Brazilian conservatism, with its Catholic and integralist roots, is rearticulated in a new form, now neoliberal and Pentecostal. In the Brazilian Congress, for example, the evangelical caucus has consistently aligned itself with the neoliberal agenda, thereby becoming a key actor in the process through which neoconservatism is reified during the Temer administration (Lacerda 2024: 210).
Although Temer signaled a commitment to a religious moral agenda in his inaugural speech, his discourse remained predominantly oriented towards economic issues and the fiscal crisis. Aligned with policies of financialization and austerity, neoconservatism was largely subsumed under the neoliberalism mask. This section has briefly examined attacks on social rights as a general feature that cuts across the Temer administration as part of its reprivatization agenda, without engaging in a detailed analysis of higher education. But this agenda for the universities outlines how his political project is actively implicated in the resurgence of Brazilian neoconservatism. The following section turns to specific discourses related to the university and higher education, as well as to responses to the Manifesto, encompassing both those that reinforce its premises and those that contest its government platform.
The Manifesto’s Discursive Network: Mapping Responses
Fairclough’s CDA provides a framework for analyzing the social transformations associated with neoliberalism in relation to the international dynamics of globalization. From this perspective, this section examines the reception of the Manifesto not only at the local level, but also in terms of its insertion within the broader context of global financialization. According to Fairclough (2003: 11), texts must be approached dynamically, with attention to how social agents texture them and, in doing so, establish social relations. Globalization is relevant not only because of the internationalized character of neoliberalism, but also due to the transnational nature of the New Right, which is here examined locally within the broader framework of neoconservatism. Fairclough (2006) further argues that analyzing the effects of globalization on language and discourse is crucial for understanding how the interplay between the global and the local generates forms of engagement between economic processes and lived social experience. Given these connections between individuals and economic processes at a global scale, shifts in economic practices are accompanied by changes in how social identities are shaped.
Such transformations are made possible through discourse, as shifts in discourse are inherent to changes in economic trajectories (Fairclough 2006: 10-11). Accordingly, CDA approaches globalization relationally, attending both to texts (discourses) and to the relationships between discourse and other elements of social life. Globalism rearticulates the relations between the market, the state, the media and other social spheres. The focus of the analysis, therefore, lies in how this process of globalization reshapes discourse over time, as well as in the evolving relationships between discourse and other elements of social life (Fairclough 2006: 23). Taken together, this subsection and the following one pose a dual challenge: not only to examine the responses to the text, but also to trace how these discourses unfold in political practice. In this context, policies and austerity-oriented measures directed at universities intersect with a neoconservative logic of reprivatization.
Reprivatization as a Discursive Response
The fiscal reforms implemented under the Temer administration, as outlined in the Manifesto, led to a brief economic recovery and modest GDP growth of 1.06% in 2017 and 1.12% in 2018, albeit at the cost of deepening social inequalities (Hoffmann and Guilherme 2021: 205). According to Lacerda (2024: 197), the proposed cuts in public spending followed the neoliberal blueprint of the Washington Consensus, including privatizations, the promotion of foreign investment, labour market deregulation, and a reduction in the state’s role in addressing social inequalities. By the end of 2018, approximately 15 million people were living in extreme poverty, returning to levels observed in the early 2000s, prior to the creation of Family Grant (Bolsa Família) (Lavinas and Gentil 2020: 5). Given the centrality of concerns over social spending in Temer’s government project, this section highlights the reprivatization dynamics embedded in his policies for higher education.
Turning to education, the first symbolic indication of the reprivatization approach under the Temer administration was the appointment of Mendonça Filho as Minister of Education. He held the post for the longest period during Temer’s government and was affiliated with the Democrats (DEM), the party that, in 2009, filed a lawsuit against racial quota policies at the University of Brasília (Supremo Tribunal Federal 2009). According to Lavinas and Gentil (2020), the neoconservative character of the Temer administration can be observed across the education system, with examples including the secondary education reform and the revival of the Escola sem Partido (Non-Partisan School) movement. The secondary education reform established a mandatory minimum curriculum of 60%, effectively excluding subjects such as history and geography. The remaining 40% could be filled by students with new subjects, such as entrepreneurship (Amaral 2017). The Escola sem Partido bill, in turn, emerged from the movement of the same name, created in 2003 by a parent who accused teachers of promoting ‘political ideology’ in the classroom (Bedinelli 2016). In 2015, the bill was formally introduced by Congressman Izalci Lucas Ferreira (PSDB), a member of the evangelical caucus in Congress. According to Lavinas and Gentil (2020), the conservative character of the Temer administration created the conditions for renewed debates around a new ‘gag law’ in schools.
In higher education, the ‘Ciência sem Fronteiras’12 (Science Without Borders) program, which funded international exchange scholarships for university students, was discontinued (Congresso em Foco 2017). In the same year, the lowest higher education budget since 2013 was allocated, with 90% of public universities experiencing significant reductions in funding. Leher (2017) highlights the crises at the State University of Rio de Janeiro, the Northern Fluminense State University, and the University Centre of the West Zone to illustrate the ‘anti-university policy’ underway at the time. Federal universities faced budget cuts that compromised their (modest) expansion over the previous decade (Leher 2017: 7). These cuts were concentrated in discretionary spending (Moreno 2018), meaning they did not affect academic staff salaries, but rather other university expenses such as security, outsourced services, infrastructure works, maintenance, and student support grants for undergraduate quota students. Such austerity measures ultimately shape which students are able to access a space historically reserved for economic elites: the Brazilian university.
Apple (2000) argues that neoconservatism in higher education aligns with neoliberal policies in order to constrain university autonomy through budgetary mechanisms. During this period, reprivatization-oriented austerity policies were reinforced by global neoliberal discursive networks (Leher 2017). One example of how universities are shaped by international dynamics can be found in the discourses articulated in the World Bank report Um ajuste justo: uma análise da eficiência da equidade do gasto público no Brasil (A Fair Adjustment: An Analysis of the Efficiency and Equity of Public Spending in Brazil), commissioned by the Temer administration. The report offers a detailed assessment of Brazil’s public spending, identifying the pension system as a central driver of fiscal imbalance (Borges 2017). It also highlights two major pressures on the national budget: pensions and public universities. The Bank’s central argument rests on a supposed injustice within public higher education, based on the claim that 65% of students belong to the richest 40% of the population (Busch 2017).
According to the report, ‘the spending on higher education is both inefficient and regressive’ (Banco Mundial 2017: 13), reinforcing the idea that public higher education institutions in Brazil constitute a ‘waste’. To ‘reduce expenditure without harming the poorest’, the Bank suggests ending free public higher education, encouraging greater private sector participation. The Bank advocates the privatization of the entire system, combined with the provision of scholarships for low-income students, arguing that private universities tend to be more cost-efficient than public ones (Banco Mundial 2017: 134). The grammar of efficiency is grounded in the logic of neoliberal austerity: the market is portrayed as a natural manager, endowed with a supposed and almost mythical capacity for self-regulation, while the state, depicted as inflated by welfare provision, is represented as spending beyond its fiscal capacity.
The analysis presented in the World Bank report can, however, be challenged on its own terms, particularly with regard to its claim about the inefficiency of Brazilian universities. Fonseca (2018) argues that, since the 1990s, despite the expansion of private higher education institutions, there has been no proportional increase in knowledge production. By 2014, 87.4% of Brazilian universities were private, yet approximately 90% of scientific and technological output remained concentrated in public universities (Fonseca 2018: 302). Since the creation of FIES, a student loan program, up to 2017, 57% of students who had taken out loans since 2009 remained in debt. Meanwhile, private education corporations such as Kroton and Estácio experienced increases of 769% and 238% in their stock values, respectively (Lavinas and Gentil 2020: 3). Eliminating public institutions, therefore, does not emerge as an effective strategy for reducing inequalities, but rather as a mechanism for deepening them, as the privatization of public universities would further increase the likelihood that low-income students fall into debt.
Not only do reports such as those produced by the World Bank endorse Temer’s reprivatization orientation, but they also reinforce fiscal austerity policies in sectors that affect some of the most vulnerable segments of the population, such as low-income students and pensioners. The reprivatization dynamics prescribed in the Bank’s recommendations become even clearer when calls to close public universities run counter to the need for developing countries to integrate into global value chains through the Knowledge-Based Economy13 (KBE). The university expansion policies pursued under Workers’ Party governments were embedded in broader dynamics of the neoliberalization of higher education, as prescribed by development models. Given that neo-developmentalist policies for higher education were aligned with the dynamics of global capital and responsive to market demands, such recommendations reveal a tension between competing development strategies. According to Rist (2008), the emergence of development discourse can be traced back to the inauguration of US President Harry Truman.
Truman’s salvationist discourse extended beyond the United States, taking shape as a broader discourse directed at the West (Rist 2008: 77), in which US scientific and technological dominance was framed as a means of fostering growth in underdeveloped regions (Rist 2008: 70). Through the discursive construction of the developed/underdeveloped dichotomy, the United States produced representations of economic backwardness in these societies. While the developed world was positioned as the locus of knowledge and technological production, integration into the market through scientific and technological advancement came to be framed as a key horizon for the underdeveloped (Rist 2008: 71). In this way, alongside the construction of the archetype of the underdeveloped, mechanisms for overcoming this condition were simultaneously articulated. These horizons were actively pursued, as, at the time, Brazilian public universities became the principal sites of scientific and technological production in the country, guided by the logic of the Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE) promoted within the PT’s neo-developmentalist project.
In sum, this section has shown that institutional discourses directed both at education in general and at public universities constitute a discursive network that reinforces the neoconservative premise of reprivatization. Higher education policies, primarily grounded in economic arguments, have affected the everyday lives of students, particularly those admitted through quota policies and those receiving financial aid. By mobilizing reprivatization as a discursive tool directed at the university, and by disseminating neoconservative values under the guise of neoliberal policies, the Temer administration played a central role in the reification of Brazilian neoconservatism. Moreover, Temer’s reprivatization discourse finds legitimacy within International Organizations. Although Brazilian higher education includes both public and private institutions, the World Bank’s guidelines are primarily directed at public universities. This discursive legitimacy reinforces the Manifesto’s position by framing education spending as wasteful, at a historical moment when universities were already under attack globally, as discussed earlier in relation to the higher education policies advanced by New Right leaders, such as Viktor Orbán. The next section turns to another dimension of the discursive responses to the Manifesto, focusing on discourses that diverge from and react against Michel Temer’s reprivatization policies.
Biopolitical Resistance as a Discursive Response
Reactions to the discourse advanced in the Manifesto and to the social policies of the Temer administration took diverse forms, encompassing both political and cultural resistance. In the field of education, secondary schools were occupied by secondary student unions as an immediate response to Temer’s policies, particularly the swift approval of Constitutional Amendment 95 and the secondary education reform. As these secondary school occupations gained momentum, the tactic was increasingly taken up within universities. By November 2016, approximately 16 university rectorates had been occupied by student movements, and the #ForaTemer (#OutWithTemer) movement began to take shape. In some states, these occupations were accompanied by strikes involving education professionals, including teachers and university staff (Mariz 2016).
As the Senate debated Constitutional Amendment 95/2016 in October and November 2016, student protests took place at the Esplanada dos Ministérios (Esplanade of Ministries) in Brasília opposing its approval. In the wake of the Jornadas de Junho (June Protests), the #ForaTemer movement organized across Brazilian states, mobilizing a wide range of protests and remaining active until the final days of Temer’s administration. Student unions and broader social movements did not accept this project for the university as the only alternative. Cannella and Koro-Ljungberg (2017: 7) argue that, even amidst the saturation of neoliberal discourse—often presented as the only viable option—a desire to act and reimagine political alternatives persisted within the university. Collective actions such as student movements not only reimagine the university, but also generate commons14 as expressions of its social and political agency, thereby reinforcing the agonistic character of public higher education institutions in Brazil.
According to Giroux (2002: 455), universities remain too elitist for classrooms to function as the sole sites of resistance and struggle. Although previous governments invested in social policies—such as affirmative action measures that diversified the university’s social and political composition—public universities continued to be accessed predominantly by higher-income groups, by the ‘elites’. Fonseca (2018: 304) argues that the expansion of universities during PT governments, alongside affirmative action policies, provided the conditions for a broader democratization of access to public higher education, but did not eliminate elitization. However, despite the initially limited radicalism of these policies—given that university expansion followed the logic of the Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE)—shifts in the university’s social and political composition nevertheless took place. These changes were sufficient to prompt a neoconservative discursive order to call for the return of difference to the private sphere.
Apple (2000) illustrates the discourse of reprivatization through education policy in the United States, more specifically in California, where a referendum banned the use of affirmative action policies in university admissions. This referendum was approved following extensive lobbying by the private higher education sector, supported by an advertising campaign that framed such policies as ‘out of control’ and as improper government intervention in decisions involving ‘individual merit’ (Apple 2000: 66). This example of reprivatization discourse reflects an approach similar to that advanced in the Manifesto, insofar as it justifies reductions in social rights while framing public spending as excessive and unwarranted. By articulating austerity discourses around the university through a grammar of inevitability, reprivatization discourses reinforce the boundaries between the public and the private, not only in economic terms but also at the level of subjectivity, as previously discussed in relation to Pateman (1988) and Mills (1997).
The displacement of identity-related issues to the private sphere enables a shift of the social towards more conservative directions in times of crisis (Apple 2000: 67). This feature appears in the Manifesto through its appeal to ‘save the economy’ in response to the global financial crisis, but becomes more explicit over the course of the Temer administration, with the emergence of discourses that more overtly advance moral issues. Apple (2000) argues that it is impossible to analyze US education policy and conservative incursions into the university system without situating them within a global context. As the Brazilian public university finds itself at the crossroads between the neo-developmentalist project of the Knowledge-Based Society and a neoconservative project that legitimizes itself through recommendations for austerity and reprivatization, such as those made by the World Bank, it becomes impossible to understand the ambiguities and disputes surrounding these institutions without situating them within the International dynamics and hierarchies. At the same time, conservative attacks on the university cannot be reduced solely to the logic of the global economy; they also involve challenges to locally grounded egalitarian norms and values (Apple 2000: 58). Corsetti (2019) argues that the relationship between neoconservatives and neoliberals is indispensable. In this way, global neoconservatism is often associated with cycles of capitalist crisis. It is therefore necessary to consider moral issues alongside the dynamics of global financialization. The author also highlights how the resurgence of Brazilian conservatism in 2018 bears similarities to developments in the United States, where debates have re-emerged around the need to set limits on political activism within the university (Corsetti 2019: 774-776).
Thus, I return to the formulation of Cocco and Cava (2018: 81) on Wild Lulism, whereby the articulation of social and affirmative action policies with a bottom-up economic dynamic—grounded in redistributive policies—produces a shift in the balance of forces within the neoliberal framework. According to Leher (2013), investments in public universities were, for the most part, closely aligned with labour market demands, reinforcing a productivist orientation. For Cocco and Cava (2018), university expansion and the quota system were essential for incorporating an educated mass into the logic of global financialization. However, as social policies under Lula’s administration expanded on a broader scale, they exceeded neoliberal modes of capture, activating elements of subjectivity dispersed throughout the social fabric and generating forms of biopolitical resistance (Cocco and Cava 2018: 85).
According to Fairclough (2006), although globalist discourse may transform the order of discourse, its hegemony can never be fully complete, as there is always an excess within social processes that enables the emergence of alternative and even contradictory discourses. Given that reprivatization discourses may arise in response to oppositional discourses, such as those associated with student protests, approaching student activism as part of these biopolitical resistances, or even as an alternative discourse, helps to clarify the interest of global neoconservatism in intervening in the university. Thus, even if Brazilian universities remain elitist and exclusionary environments, they have already been permeated by difference. This has produced fractures that heterogenize their social and political composition, enriching this agonistic environment and expanding its capacity to ‘imagine other worlds’, as discussed by Kamola (2019).
Conclusion
Michel Temer did not seek re-election, not only due to his high rejection rates and low popularity, but also because his short-lived administration was conceived as an undertaking with an end in itself. According to Saad-Filho and Morais (2018), although Temer’s government was extraordinarily exclusionary, it was not sufficient to set in motion broader historical forces. Amid governmental crises and corruption scandals, it only partially consolidated a neoliberal hegemony. However, this may not have been merely a ‘failure’; its neoconservative reprivatizing interventions were at times subtle, yet still discernible in their discursive effects. As suggested by the Manifesto, with its call for emergency and temporary measures, the Temer administration was never conceived as a long-term project.
The discursive framing of the 2021 interview given to Roda Viva, discussed in the introduction, further demonstrates that the Temer administration was always conceived as finite; there was no project of continuity embodied in his leadership, as his government consistently presented itself as a bridge to what was already to come. It may be that the Temer administration did not fail to transform hegemony; rather, its transformations within the political order were already sufficiently robust to foster a transition towards even more conservative social conditions. In this sense, his government succeeded in reifying Brazilian neoconservatism, as the policies outlined in the Manifesto paved the way for a government that no longer needed to mask its moral conservatism under the guise of neoliberalism. Furthermore, Temer remained closely connected to Bolsonaro, being called upon to manage political crises, such as mediating tensions between the former president and Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, as well as helping to stabilize relations after the end of Bolsonaro’s administration (Soares and Schmitt 2022; Lima 2024).
The neoconservative project that advanced under the Temer administration, through its reprivatization policies, should not be minimized as less conservative due to its relative subtlety; rather, it must be recognized as one of the structural conditions that enabled the resurgence of neoconservatism in Brazil. The Temer government operated discursively to stigmatize the Brazilian university by attributing to the education budget a sense of dysfunction and inefficiency to be corrected, thereby symbolically authorizing the questioning of the university’s political and social role. In this way, its governmental project, together with the discourses generated from the Manifesto, established a form of discursive legitimacy for the emergence of more aggressive narratives concerning the university, its knowledge production, and academic freedom. When situated within a global context, these policies reveal clear affinities with a broader neoconservative discursive network. The reprivatization policies of the Temer administration were therefore not a local or isolated political practice, but part of a wider discursive formation that understands the university as a space capable of constructing and legitimizing social and political imaginaries.
Acknowledgments
This article is based on the author’s master’s thesis, defended at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) in 2023. The underlying research was funded by the Jean Monnet Network (Erasmus+) project Crisis-Equity-Democracy for Europe and Latin America. The present article substantially revises and expands the original research. This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES) – Finance Code 001.
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