ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the legislative process of pension reform in Lula´s government. The focus of the work is the role played by the union caucus (deputies and senators) in the political agreement for the approval of the PEC Paralela da Previdência. The analysis’s restriction to the parliamentary procedure of the matter is not accidental, it is a theoretical-methodological approach directed to the main locus of the decision-making process of social security reforms in democratic regimes: the legislative arena. In political-institutional situations in which a government considered an ally presents a legislative proposal that contradicts the interests of important sectors of the union base, do union parliamentarians vote in favor or against the project submitted by the Executive? The research findings confirm the hypothesis of the predominance of party guidance over the parliamentary behavior of the union bloc. However, the results also demonstrate that it is not a matter of mere political subordination, but a complex negotiation process involving institutional, party and union agents.
Lula government; unionism; social security reform; decision-making process; Executive-Legislative relations