Impacts of rent-seeking on the public budget: the effect of the “Ambulance Mafia” case on municipalities in Mato Grosso State

Abstract:

Discussions on discretionary fiscal policy often underscore its potential negative impacts on economic development. This study examines the consequences of such policies in the context of rent-seeking practices, particularly focusing on healthcare expenditures by municipalities in Mato Grosso during the “Ambulance Mafia” scandal (2001 to 2006). Our empirical analysis reveals a significant increase in discretionary fiscal measures during the corruption case, particularly among implicated municipalities, indicating heightened budget execution for healthcare expenses. Importantly, our findings underscore that excessive use of this policy not only harms the economy but also adversely affects social development indicators. In summary, excessive public spending beyond an optimal threshold correlates with detrimental effects on local population health. This relationship between discretionary budgetary policy and IFDM-Health was evident in the context of the “Ambulance Mafia.”

Keywords:
corruption; public finances; public spending; healthcare; municipalities