Abstract
What do we mean by the assertion “it is proved that”? The main argument of this article is that it is a problem of probative significance, whose proper understanding goes through the central concept of intentionality, about which we found many problems, we need to distinguish semiotic dimensions and specify a constellation of logical notions. The purpose of this article is to discuss these issues, based on an approach that mobilizes arguments from the philosophy of mind and language, especially found in the theories of J. R. Searle. In the end, we hope to make it clear that the evidential meaning, although it presupposes a mind and is found in procedural language, consists of a specific intermediate intentionality, which can theoretically benefit from the two conceptual bases, and thus make evident everything that is assumed in the assertion “it is proven that”.
Keywords
signification; intentionality; semiotics; proof
Thumbnail
Thumbnail
