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Dossier 2: “Human mobility and climate crisis” • REMHU 32 • 2024 • https://doi.org/10.1590/1980-858525038800032209 linkcopy

Open-access Toward an Ecological-Political Understanding of Migration from Tunisia: Exploring the Role of Energy Policies in Southern Ecosystems' Desertification

Para uma compreensão ecológico-política da migração da Tunísia: explorando o papel das políticas de energia na desertificação dos ecossistemas do sul

AuthorshipSCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

    Abstract

    This article examines the phenomenon of people in movement by considering the human and environmental impact of export-oriented energy policies through the case study of Southern Tunisia’s territory and communities. The analysis aims to interrogate the neglected link between the social-economic context of territories hosting impactful energy infrastructures, the resulting control over ‘human’ and ‘natural’ ecosystems that inhabit these territories, and their consequent abandonment, leading to migration. The research sheds light on how coercive measures and oppressive policies prioritize maximal resource extraction, depriving local citizens of their agency. Consequently, communities no longer resist the establishment of energy infrastructure, leading to the abandonment of their land and the loss of control over natural resources. By adopting a political ecology approach, this article aims to expand the category of climate migrants arguing that the economic criterion cannot be omitted nor separated from the climatic one. The case study of Southern Tunisia exemplifies the dynamics of precarity and structural poverty underlying migration peculiar to territories where, paradoxically, high value-added resources such as oil and gas as well as renewable energy are extracted and exported.

    Keywords: climate migrant; Tunisia; Mediterranean; energy; renewable

    Resumo

    Este artigo examina o fenômeno das pessoas em movimento, considerando o impacto humano e ambiental das políticas energéticas voltadas para a exportação, por meio do estudo de caso do território e das comunidades do sul da Tunísia. A análise visa interrogar a relação negligenciada entre o contexto socioeconômico dos territórios, que abrigam infraestruturas energéticas de grande impacto, o consequente controle sobre os ecossistemas “humanos” e “naturais” que habitam esses territórios e seu abandono, que leva à migração. A pesquisa lança luz sobre como as medidas coercitivas e as políticas opressivas priorizam a extração máxima de recursos, privando os cidadãos locais de sua agência. Assim sendo, as comunidades deixam de resistir à implantação de infraestruturas energéticas, o que leva ao abandono de suas terras e à perda de controle sobre os recursos naturais. Ao adotar uma abordagem de ecologia política, este artigo visa expandir a categoria de migrantes climáticos, argumentando que o critério econômico não pode ser omitido nem separado do climático. O estudo de caso do sul da Tunísia exemplifica a dinâmica da precariedade e da pobreza estrutural subjacente à migração. É uma dinâmica típica dos territórios onde, paradoxalmente, são extraídos e exportados recursos de alto valor agregado, como petróleo e gás, bem como energia renovável.

    Palavras-chave: migrante climático; Tunísia; Mediterrâneo; energia; renovável

    Introduction

    Early scholarship on migration primarily understood it through the lens of classical economic theory, which posits that populations move linearly from poorer to richer areas (McLeman, 2017, p. 5). However, during the second half of the 20th century, additional factors have been introduced, including environmental considerations (McLeman, 2017, p. 6). While extensive literature explores the complex roots of migration, the collective perception of migrants by international agencies and European institutions, which still reduces them to the classification of 'economic migrant' (European Parliament, 2023), remains anchored in a generic idea of escaping poverty and unemployment. The economic criteria are consistently isolated from what are considered climatic push factors: floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and weather conditions with a short, intense temporality (IOM). This article aims to challenge this dichotomy by defining a climate migrant not simply as the victim of a violent tropical storm, but as every person who moves due to environmental factors because he or she is unable to adapt to a major change in their living environment (McLeman, 2017; Cernea, 1991, p. 188-215), recognizing it as part of a living ecosystem (Moore, 2017). Therefore, we propose to consider not merely the motivations linked to the individual experience of people in movement, but also what Robert McLeman defines as macro-level forces, such as long-term political, economic, demographic, and climatic processes leading to migration.

    Through a case study, this analysis aims to highlight a paradox: areas pivotal for producing high-value-added resources, such as energy, interpreted as both fossil and renewably sourced, are simultaneously migration departure regions. However, despite yielding substantial revenue for both private companies and public budget, the wealth generated from these resources does not trickle down to the population (Hamouchene, Sandwell, 2023). Without redistribution mechanisms, local communities bear the brunt of extractive infrastructures’ negative impacts, while reaping no economic benefits from them (Hamouchene, Sandwell, 2023). In addition to disrupting the delicate equilibrium of living ecosystems, export-oriented energy policies deepen inequalities within low- and middle-income countries where extraction occurs, thus perpetuating internal colonial dynamics (Khiari, 2003, pp. 98-100). Moreover, they widen the disparity between exporting and importing partners, typically situated in the Global North. Such disparities delineate what Jason W. Moore refers to as commodity frontiers: not merely a linear, geographical, established border, but rather a strategy of power, profit, and life (Moore, 2021) domination leading to structural migration.

    The case of Tunisia, closely monitored by both European institutions and international organizations for its strategic role in implementing border control and externalization policies, serves as a poignant example. Tunisia, which has become in 2023 the main departure point for migrants seeking to cross the Mediterranean into Europe, particularly Italy (IOM, UNHCR), is not exempt from the discourse on 'economic migration'. Since the 2011-2012 peak of Tunisian nationals' arrivals (Natter, 2015), the public discourse has often fixated on a generic 'economic crisis' without delving into its temporal or causal dimensions. Alongside other North African countries such as Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt, Tunisia is included in most of the EU countries' list of Safe Countries of Origin (EUAA, 2022), reinforcing the notion that Tunisians migrate solely for economic or work-related causes. The same fixed categorization is often used to justify mass expulsions on a national basis, undermining the validity of the reasons driving migration. This misleading narrative serves to delineate the division between 'Us' and 'Them' within what Jason W. Moore describes as the ongoing Civilizing Project (Moore, 2021, pp. 14-20), which shapes a cultural hegemony with the purpose of ensuring commodity production.

    As the geographer Diana K. Davis argues in her examination of the Environmental Orientalism concept, expanding on the definition of the Palestinian author Edward Said, the description of North Africa as a naturally poor, degraded region exemplifies a reductive reading of internal and external power dynamics based on land appropriation and imperial practices (Davis, 2011). While the argument of ‘a country without a future’ succeeds in justifying to Western public opinion the arrival of so-called ‘migration flows’ and the intervention of international cooperation, it also justify the extraction of resources that territories described by Anglo-European imaginaries as economically unattractive effectively possess (Davis, 2011). The intricate network of pipelines and planned submarine cables, through which fossil fuel multinationals, supported by local governments, transport gas, oil, or will transport electricity from the South to the North shore of the Mediterranean, embodies the paradox explored in this article and unmasks the Anthropocene imperial rhetoric of natural poverty. These pipelines and cables traversing the Mediterranean trace the same route currently taken by migrants attempting to leave the same extraction territories.

    The migration-energy territorial nexus is particularly evident in the governorates of Southern Tunisia, namely Tataouine and Kebili, two of the country's with among the highest poverty rates areas but rich in natural resources such as oil, gas, and groundwater reserves, crucial for the development of renewable energy projects (INS, 2020). In these regions, the Tunisian state responded to demands for profit redistribution from local social movements with repression and militarization, especially in areas of high energy interest. This militarization coincided with an increase in migration from Tunisia, particularly evident in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022), as seen in Tataouine (Meddeb, 2023), which will be discussed in Paragraph 1. Additionally, we will delve into the processes of appropriation that shape accumulation, beginning with land appropriation, to be examined in Paragraph 2. The recent EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding explicitly addresses both migration control and energy cooperation, emphasizing the transition to renewable energy as an avenue for growth (European Parliament, 2023). This underscores the need to explore the intersection of migration and export-oriented energy production along the Mediterranean commodity frontier. Paragraph 3 will elucidate how green energy projects may fall short in ensuring social and environmental sustainability, potentially contributing to ecosystem degradation.

    Methodology

    This research is grounded in extensive fieldwork conducted between 2022 and 2023 in Southern Tunisia, focusing on energy policies and their evolution within the Tunisian legislative framework, particularly with the emergence of renewable sources. Interviews were conducted during several trips at different times: in September and October 2022, as part of a journalistic investigation on renewable energies in the Tataouine and Kebili regions; in July 2022, for a report on the consequences of the oil and gas sector in Tunisia, covering Tataouine, Kebili, and Gafsa; and in July and December 2023, for a journalistic investigation on raw material extractivism in the Gafsa and Kebili regions. The interviews were conducted in both Arabic and French, and were later translated into English with the support of a Tunisian colleague and translator. The material was transcribed and reorganized according to the respective projects. The idea for an article emerged from the realization that common themes consistently appeared among the interviewees. Migration issues naturally surfaced during numerous interviews with various stakeholders, including members of civil society, trade unionists from the energy sector, environmental activists, and representatives of local communities from the Southern Tunisian governorates. The consistent references to migration gathered during interviews underscored the significance of this issue, particularly when analyzed alongside migratory events occurring during the research period.

    The selection of Tataouine and Kebili Tunisian governorates as primary case studies serves to highlight two distinct yet interconnected scenarios: Tataouine's significance in Tunisian oil and gas production and Kebili's pivotal role in the development of renewable energy policies. This focus highlights how different approaches to the management of energy resources both contribute to the desertification of living ecosystems, especially when the primary goal is to extract high-value resources for export without accompanying redistributive policies. By juxtaposing these scenarios, the study aims to elucidate how resource management decisions impact ecosystem degradation and, consequently, influence migration patterns. The case study is approached through the lens of political ecology, aiming to contextualize and politicize recent migratory episodes from southern Tunisia to Europe to complicate the classical understanding of migration, particularly the concept of so-called climate migration as defined by international institutions. This is accomplished by deconstructing its mainstream interpretation and reconfiguring it to include new criteria, such as the impact of extractive policies on living ecosystems. The main difficulties were encountered in accessing figures. Official ethnographic data, often oversimplified, appear insufficient for capturing the complexity of empirical research in Tunisia. The calculation of poverty and unemployment rates often relies on national data collected many years ago, thereby failing to reflect the current economic and social landscape, especially in the aftermath of Covid-19. Their unavailability conflicts with the precise figures that are constantly produced on departures and arrivals of migrants in the Mediterranean, thereby underscoring the urgency of politicizing data measurement methods.

    The Tataouine Paradox: From Resource Access Struggle to Collective Migration

    After the migration wave of 2022, local media characterized the city of Tataouine as noticeably lacking in young people, with predominantly elderly residents and children (Bahri, 2022). Tataouine is situated in Tunisia's southernmost homonymous governorate, with a total population of 150,000 concentrated in a few towns surrounded by a semi-desert plain (INS, 2016). This governorate has emerged as a significant departure point for Tunisian migrants seeking to reach Europe during the post-COVID-19 period, from 2020 to 2022 (Meddeb, 2023). While characterizing Tataouine as a city without youth might be an exaggeration, data estimated by local scholars (as no official data are available yet) suggest that approximately 12,000 young people departed from the region during this period, constituting around 8% of the population. Unlike the more traditional central Mediterranean route, migrants from Tataouine preferred a path leading to Western Europe via Serbia: during this period, Tunisian nationals could easily enter Serbia through regular flight and proceed along the Balkan route (Meddeb, 2023). Nevertheless, pressure from the EU compelled Serbia to close its borders in November 2022, leading to the implementation of visa requirements for Tunisians (Bzganovic, Gec, 2022).

    This episode of punctual collective migration, which prompted the redefinition of Serbian border policies, can be attributed to several factors. The economic repercussions of COVID-19 on a marginal region like Tataouine, emphasized by researcher Hamza Meddeb, cannot be underestimated. Moreover, a 2020 survey on the governance of migration funded by the European Union and implemented by the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics, the National Migration Observatory, and the Austrian ICMPD, confirms that Tataouine governorate, alongside Kebili, stands out for having a higher propensity among young people aged 16 to 29 to migrate. This migratory episode should be interpreted as a structural consequence of the neoliberal policies implemented over the long term at regional, national, and global levels, and their detrimental effects on the balance of living ecosystems. Zooming out further on the timeline, the occurrence of these migration episodes aligns with the end of negotiations between social movements in the Tataouine region and the government, resulting in a stalemate after years of mobilization and protests.

    We specifically refer here to the Al-Kamour sit-in, which began in April 2017 at the eponymous oil and gas facility in the Tataouine desert, 500 km from Tunis, and concluded in 2020. Its demands deserve attention within the context of a region abundant in gas and oil resources but afflicted by one of the highest unemployment rates in Tunisia, standing at 27.6% (with peaks exceeding 40% in some areas), compared to the national rate of 16.4% (INS, 2023). Before becoming the focus of migration-related news headlines, the region of Tataouine was primarily renowned for its gas and oil resources, exploited through joint ventures between ETAP, the Tunisian Oil Activities Enterprise, and various international oil companies, notably BG Group, ENI, and OMV (EIA) - operating under Tunisia’s concession system. Despite its oil barrel production being incomparable with regional standards, the oil and gas sector holds significant national economic importance. It has consistently contributed between 3 and 7 percent to the Tunisian GDP and accounted for 8 to 18 percent of exports over the past two decades (Nakhle, Lassourd, 2019). Before the beginning of the El-Kamour sit-in, the combined oil production from the Tataouine and Kebili regions accounted for 48 percent of Tunisia's total oil production and 25 percent of its total gas production in 2016 (Nakhle, Lassourd, 2019).

    These data on the wealth generated at the regional level in an area often labeled by both foreign and local media as peripheral, enduring severe climatic conditions, have not gone unnoticed by a local population that inherited a strong political consciousness and propensity for collective mobilization from the Gafsa mining basin 2008 protests that led to the 2011 revolution (McCarthy, 2021, p. 798-815). Since April 2017, thousands of unemployed people have occupied and blocked the crucial valve at El-Kamour within an oil pipeline that spans the region from South to North. This action has ignited a prolonged struggle with central authorities and prompted government negotiations that previous classical square protests had failed to achieve (McCarthy, 2021, p. 798-815). Despite being frequently criticized and overlooked by the national press, the El-Kamour sit-in openly addressed the issue of resource exploitation by national and foreign companies, contending that the revenue generated from valuable resources such as oil did not benefit the local community. Their demands included a fair distribution of the region's oil and gas revenues, specifically requesting that 20% of these funds be invested in Tataouine (Cherif, 2017). Additionally, they advocated for a $40 million investment in regional infrastructure and development projects (Cherif, 2017). While some groups called for the nationalization of natural resources, the primary demand of the sit-in was access to the job market. Protesters also urged authorities to compel oil and gas companies to create a minimum of 4,500 jobs for locals (Cherif, 2017).

    Employment opportunities within multinational companies exploiting the oil and gas resources in southern Tunisia are scarce for local residents, not solely due to the gradual decrease in production since 2011 (Nakhle, Lassourd, 2019). Fieldwork interviews in Tataouine confirmed that only a few menial jobs outsourced to Tunisian companies are occasionally secured by locals. According to the 2014 census data, a meager average of 0.75% to 2.4% of the population across different delegations within the governorate were employed in the energy sector. Instead, a significant portion of the workforce was found in many lower-wage jobs in public services (education, health, administrative services), construction, or manufacturing (INS, 2016, p. 38-42). International corporations typically prioritize hiring from the coastal region of Tunisia, known as the Sahel, due to perceived higher skill levels, interviews confirmed. This discrimination in employment, masking well-structured patterns of corruption known to the authorities (Khiari, 2003, p. 97), exacerbates the division between urban and rural areas, creating what Tunisian scholars refer to as a proper frontier separating the interior from the metropolis, itself divided into modern, disadvantaged districts (Khiari, 2003, p. 98).

    Tunisian scholar Sadri Khiari identifies the process of liberalization and privatization following the International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986 as the catalyst for the creation of these “new frontiers” and the erosion of redistribution mechanisms in favor of market logic. This market logic relies on a cheap labor force, a concept that Jason W. Moore includes in the larger category of Cheap Nature. This definition is clearly applicable to the case of southern Tunisia, whose living ecosystem had a singular destiny: gradual desertification leading to human migration. We, therefore, propose an ecological-political interpretation of “desertification”, encompassing not only its traditional definition of land degradation caused by climatic factors and global warming but also the gradual desertion of land by local communities unable to adapt. In this context, the abandonment of territories becomes part of the process of appropriation without resistance. Field interviews confirmed that low wages offered by subcontractors (Cheap Labour), coupled with high unemployment rates, are driving residents away from the region, contributing to socio-ecological disintegration. Consequently, social rebellion becomes increasingly unlikely (Khiari, 2003, p. 100). Additionally, hiring non-local workers offers an advantage beyond economic factors: they have no direct ties to the land.

    Land Grabbing and Militarization: Setting Borders in Southern Tunisia

    If we adopt the politico-ecological critique, which considers capitalism as something more-than-human (Moore, 2017, p.3), and acknowledge that the supposed dichotomy between Humans and Nature, typical of the Anthropocene theory, oversimplifies reality, then the study of migration cannot be limited to the context of origin interpreted solely as a political, territorial entity defined by national borders. Instead, it should be regarded as an entire ecosystem, where “all social and natural limits are irreducibly socio-ecological” (Moore, 2011, p. 17), and abstraction from class and empire (Moore, 2017, p.2) serves the purpose of appropriation. This underscores why land dispossession, a primary and essential condition of population displacement (McLeman, 2017), is a central issue intricately linked to migration, particularly in post-colonial contexts where the status of lands is still contentious, such as in Tunisia.

    In the wake of the rural crisis that prompted the development of suburban areas around major Tunisian cities in the 1990s (Amara et al., 2019), the semi-desert region of Tataouine, traditionally dependent on agro-pastoralism (Fetoui et al., 2021), has witnessed a significant decline in livelihoods. This decline can be attributed partially to the conflict over the management of community lands by the state, local-level management councils, and citizens in the post-independence period (1956-present) (Elloumi, 2013). This conflict has favored the establishment of infrastructure for extracting high-value energy resources within the context of liberalization and privatization in the 1970s and 1980s (Elloumi, 2013; Sghaier et al., 2020), leading to the subsequent rural exodus. This phenomenon has led to actual instances of land grabbing, facilitated by state police/military control over areas of energy interest, which social movements contested in the post-2011 revolution period. Several legislative measures can confirm the extent to which land control affects community displacement in southern Tunisia.

    Shortly after the beginning of the El-Kamour sit-in, Presidential Decree No. 2017-90 of 3 July 2017 declared sensitive and vital production sites as prohibited military zones, authorizing the military units responsible for security to use any means in possession in case of aggression or attacks, including acts of sabotage. The areas declared sensitive by the Ministry of Energy - which included several energy facilities in the Tataouine region, including El-Kamour - were further expanded in 2018, taking a large portion of territory away from the population with significant socio-ecological consequences. The extensive control exerted by the State over vast areas of southern Tunisia through the Ministry of Defense, ostensibly in the name of 'public interest,' has facilitated the acquisition of land by major foreign corporations, thus depriving local communities of collective lands they have historically claimed since the independence of the country (Elloumi, 2013).

    While Tunisian society, as the other North African societies, has traditionally known communal land management since the Ottoman Empire (Elloumi, 2013), the law of 14 January 1971 implemented a liberal land policy based on the privatization of collective land, with “enormous repercussions not only on the structuring steppe and Saharan areas but also on traditional values and practices”, writes southern Tunisian scholar Abdallah Ben Sâad. The question of ownership is central because it is linked to that of community identity and a sense of belonging, implying rootedness. Interviews with some Tataouine workers employed by energy subcontracting companies, which are reliant on multinational fossil fuel companies, confirmed their belief that when non-local workers exploit local land, it facilitates control over resources because the consequences on the land - regarded as a living ecosystem - do not directly or personally affect them. Migration, therefore, can also be understood as a component in the eradication of agency and dissent within the affected communities. The phrase "they are pushing us all out of here," repeated by several members of the Tataouine community, highlights the concrete impact of a permanent situation of inequality firstly on residents from actual or former rural regions (Amara et al., 2019).

    Furthermore, in addition to legitimizing opaque practices conducted by fossil fuel companies in regions distant from community oversight, where instances of environmental damage have been reported (Inkyfada, 2022a; ReCommon, 2023), militarization has also steadily undermined the informal economy along the border between Libya and Tunisia (Meddeb, 2023). These two factors exacerbated structural labor insecurity. In border territories such as the Tataouine governorate, the informal economy serves as a crucial livelihood source amidst unemployment and disruption to traditional work practices (Doron, 2020). Finally, while a huge part of Tataouine's youth was migrating to Serbia, several leaders and coordinators of the Kamour protests were being sentenced by military courts for their involvement in the events covering the period from 2017 to 2020 (Meddeb, 2023), as confirmed by field interviews. The conditions leading to the frontierization of a territory once characterized by steady mobility, such as transhumance, collective farming, and land rotation (Fetoui et al., 2021), intersect. It is precisely the transformation of land into an immobile and militarized zone, aimed at maximizing the extraction of energy resources, that leaves emigration as the only viable option, as its residents no longer benefit from the territory’s adaptability.

    Renewable Energy in Kebili: A Distinct Source, a Common Appropriation Mechanism

    To understand the centrality of land policies in the analysis of migration, it is crucial to discard historical narratives that portray former colonial territories, like North Africa and Tunisia, as unproductive, deserted, and useless (Davis, 2011). French scholar Paul Bouet illustrates this through an analysis of French imperial policies in Algeria, where the notion of "mise en valeur" (enhancement) of the Sahara justified the exploitation of desert resources such as minerals, gas, and oil. The enduring colonial cultural legacy still supports and rationalizes the exploitation of extensive territories for the advancement of renewable energy initiatives, frequently on a substantial scale, still rooted in the colonial mindset (Bouet, 2021) which underlines the ongoing Civilizing Project according to Jason W. Moore. Algerian scholar Hamza Hamouchene succinctly sums up the dynamics of subordination perpetuated by contemporary investments in financially lucrative renewable energy as green colonialism (Hamouchene, Sandwell, 2023). Despite the rhetoric around “sustainability”, indeed, the proliferation of large-scale mining ventures focusing on renewable sources has not mitigated the trend of land grabbing; instead, it has exacerbated it (Inkyfada, 2022b).

    Recent legislative changes in Tunisia have significantly reshaped the landscape, particularly concerning land access for foreign investors aiming to construct renewable energy projects. In 2022, two decree laws were enacted, signaling a new phase in the country's energy development. Decree-law no. 2022-65 grants any public entity the authority to acquire land for "public utility" projects, effectively permitting land expropriation (Inkyfada, 2022b) as the last stage of a long process of privatization of collective goods that began in the 1970s. This policy shift has facilitated the implementation of decree-law no. 2022-68, which specifically targets renewable energy production by enabling projects on public agricultural and non-agricultural land, as well as land owned by local authorities under lease agreements.

    These legislative amendments build upon the foundation laid by Law No. 2015-12 on renewable energy, ratified in 2015, which marked a significant milestone in Tunisia's transition to green energy projects. This law initiated the process of liberalizing the electricity market, previously monopolized by the state-owned Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas (STEG), known for its substantial indebtedness, interviews confirmed (Inkyfada, 2022b). Moreover, it incentivized the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to advance renewable energy initiatives, with a particular emphasis on facilitating large-scale export projects (2019) (Inkyfada, 2022b). One such project is the CSP technology mega-solar power plant station proposed in the Kebili governorate by the British-Tunisian company TuNur, which claims to be able to provide low-cost electricity to 2 million European homes and reduce CO2 emissions by five million tonnes per year (Inkyfada, 2022b).

    It should be noted that TuNur, which portrays itself as a consortium of shareholders, has yet to implement any solar panels, instead functioning more as a lobbying entity promoting an export-focused transition in Tunisia (TuNur.tn, 2024). Tunisia's economy, diversified beyond reliance solely on oil and gas revenues, encompasses various income streams from manufacturing industries, particularly focused on low value-added and assembly activities (Krichen, 2021), positioning it as a promising center for renewable energy.

    Since the initiation of negotiations on the Comprehensive and In-depth Free Trade Agreement (ALECA) between Tunisia and the European Union (EU) in October 2015, the potential of the energy transition has consistently been emphasized in EU-Tunisian agreements (Observatoire Tunisien de l’Économie, 2019), even when primarily addressing migration policies, as evident in the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding (European Parliament, 2023). Tunisia has set ambitious targets to increase the share of renewable energies to 35 percent of electricity production capacity by 2030 (World Bank, 2023). However, these endeavors have faced criticism from trade unions and environmental advocates, contending that renewable energy production prioritizes profit interests aligned with EU liberalization policies over local energy needs, contributing to defining the Mediterranean commodity frontier. Additionally, concerns persist regarding the sustainability of large-scale projects like the TuNur CSP mega solar power plant and export-oriented green hydrogen initiatives, particularly due to their significant water consumption amidst structural drought conditions (Inkyfada, 2022b; Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2022).

    Moreover, the TuNur project's location on collective land controlled by the army in the southern Tunisian area of Rjim Maatoug, Kebili governorate, raises concerns about how the "fight against migration" may have been used as a pretext for the installation of agricultural or energy extraction projects in this frontier desert area. As field interviews confirmed, the Tunisian Ministry of Defence has been involved in the sedentarization of the nomadic community in areas of high energy interest close to the Tunisian-Algerian border since the 1980s. The Rjim Maatoug area, which still attracts investors in renewables, is often cited as a virtuous example of European “green” policies, capable of making life more sustainable in inhospitable lands such as the desert by “greening it” through monocropping production of dates and/or green energy projects (Inkyfada, 2022b). The distortion of the narrative in favor of the installation of extractive “green” projects once again defines the hegemonic relations between the North and South shores and contributes to creating the conditions for the abandonment of a living ecosystem. Although the data confirm that the marginalized region of Kebili is deeply affected by migration (INS, 2020), high-value-added energy projects are not yet considered as beneficial to local communities. Instead, they perpetuate the extractive methods typical of fossil energy production and their socio-ecological consequences (Hamouchene, Sandwell, 2023).

    Conclusion

    This article does not aim to provide a list of migration causes but rather seeks to explore the complexity hidden by a reductionist yet widely accepted classification of the phenomenon, which facilitates the segmentation into categories and control of migrants' bodies crossing the Mediterranean border. As global warming intensifies each year in the Mediterranean region (Urdiales-Flores et al., 2023), and Tunisia experiences its increasingly severe effects like structural drought, the study of so-called climate migrations proves to be crucial, albeit insufficient. Often examined through a cultural lens that obscures the underlying power dynamics and inequalities, both external and internal, North Africa is not immune to an orientalist interpretation of environmental issues (Davis, 2011) that portrays it as naturally arid, impoverished, and devastated-a natural departure context composed of many Safe Countries of Origin (based solely on political criteria), where the international community aims to address economic and sometimes climatic gaps. Along the Mediterranean, however, crystallizes a frontier much deeper than the walls built with EU funds for border control: a commodities frontier. The necropolitical choices behind it are not questioned by the current management of migrations through its international agencies (UNHCR, IOM). However, these render the movement of people and communities not only inevitable but part of a structural export-oriented system of production emphasized by the extractive energy market, as highlighted by the southern Tunisian case study of Tataouine and Kebili. Its consequences on and connections with the migratory phenomenon are particularly relevant at a time when international energy policies are "greening," bringing with them the rhetoric of environmental and social sustainability as a condition to contribute to the fight against so-called irregular migrations. Questioning the Global North's imaginary regarding migrations and their current classification, which only partially includes the climatic criterion, is crucial. Applying an ecological-political approach to the study of migration, this article challenges the Cartesian dichotomy typical of the Anthropocene theory (Man/Nature) in the understanding of a migration case study. The alarmed discussions around desertification in territories particularly exposed to global warming must also acknowledge indigenous communities' abandonment of these lands, as well as of their traditions - deadly effects on a balanced living ecosystem in the larger Mediterranean, beyond these states' borders.

    Bibliography

    • Dossier editors
      Joan Lacomba, Beatriz Felipe

    Publication Dates

    • Publication in this collection
      11 Nov 2024
    • Date of issue
      2024

    History

    • Received
      21 May 2024
    • Accepted
      18 July 2024
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