Resumo em Português:

Neste artigo, examinamos duas abordagens bastante influentes sobre a natureza das atribuições/explicações funcionais: a abordagem etiológica selecionista de Wright e a análise funcional de Cummins. A primeira parece capturar de modo adequado o significado de várias explicações na biologia evolutiva, ainda que não dê conta de toda e qualquer explicação evolutiva. A segunda, por sua vez, é mais aplicável a explicações fisiológicas ou de outras áreas científicas que lidam com sistemas complexos. Entendemos as duas teorias como empreitadas distintas, que não devem ser combinadas em uma abordagem única sobre as funções. Isso nos leva a apoiar a rejeição de tal unidade por Godfrey-Smith, na forma de sua tese do consenso dualista. Esta tese pode ser ancorada na distinção entre biologia evolutiva e biologia funcional, esboçada por Mayr e Jacob. Tratamos também da crítica de Cummins às abordagens etiológicas selecionistas, as quais ele denomina "neoteleológicas". Embora consideremos que várias das críticas de Cummins de fato localizam falhas nessas abordagens, buscamos mostrar que sua tentativa de rejeição da neoteleologia como um todo é ilegítima. A partir das críticas de ambos os lados do debate sobre as funções, a compreensão desta noção central da biologia tem sido sobremaneira enriquecida. As críticas reforçam a necessidade de delimitar o escopo e o limite de cada uma das abordagens e, assim, apontam no sentido de um pluralismo no debate sobre atribuições/explicações funcionais na filosofia da biologia.

Resumo em Inglês:

In this paper, we examine two very influential approaches to the nature of functional explanations/attributions: Wright's selectionist etiological approach and Cummins' functional analysis. The former seems to adequately grasp the meaning of several explanations in evolutionary biology, even though it is not sufficient to account for each and every evolutionary explanation. The latter, in turn, is more applicable to explanations in physiology and in other scientific areas dealing with complex systems. We see these two theories as distinct enterprises, which should not be combined in a single approach to functions. This leads us to support Godfrey-Smith's rejection of such a unity, in the form of his dualist consensus thesis. This thesis can be grounded on the distinction between evolutionary and functional biology, as sketched by Mayr and Jacob. We also address Cummins' critique of selectionist etiological approaches, which he labels as "neo-teleological". Although we consider that several criticisms raised by Cummins do identify flaws in these approaches, we intend to show that his attempt to reject neo-teleology as a whole is illegitimate. Criticisms from both sides of the debates about functions are contributing to enrich the comprehension of this central concept in Biology. These criticisms reinforce the need of delimiting the scope and limits of each approach, and, thus, point in the direction of a pluralism in the debate about functional explanations/attributions in the Philosophy of Biology.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Después de reseñar las circunstancias que precedieron a la redacción de El origen de las especies, analizo la estructura de la obra distinguiendo tres conjuntos de capítulos: aquellos en los que Darwin presenta lo que caracterizaré como el silogismo fundamental de su largo argumento; aquellos en donde responde posibles objeciones a sus tesis; y aquellos en donde se desarrollan las consecuencias de su teoría y se destaca su poder explicativo. Finalmente, examinaré las razones por las cuales esta última parte de la obra, centrada sobre todo en la teoría de la filiación común, tuvo una mejor acogida, y un impacto más inmediato, que aquella consagrada a la propia teoría de la selección natural.

Resumo em Inglês:

After a review of the circumstances that preceded the writing of On the origin of species, I analyze the structure of the work distinguishing three sets of chapters: those in which Darwin presents what I will characterize as the fundamental syllogism of his long argument; those where he answers possible objections to his thesis; and those where he develops the consequences of his theory, emphasizing its explanatory power. Finally, I will examine the reasons for which the latter part of the work, mainly focused on the theory of common descent, had a better reception, and a more immediate impact, than that dedicated to the theory of natural selection in itself.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Analizamos aquí la teoría de la degeneración de Morel tal como fue definida en su Tratado de degeneración de la especie humana, publicado en 1857. Ese texto surge como una tentativa de dar respuesta a las dificultades con las que la naciente psiquiatría debía enfrentarse. A partir de ese momento, comenzó a construirse ese suelo epistemológico que posibilitó la creación y la posterior consolidación de una psiquiatría ampliada que, aún hoy, parece obcecada en clasificar y patologizar los más variados comportamientos. La teoría de la degeneración crea un marco explicativo amplio de la enfermedad mental, en el interior del cual desaparecen las barreras taxativas entre alienación y degeneraciones menores, definidas como desvíos físicos o morales del tipo primitivo. A partir de ese momento, la psiquiatría sale de los muros del asilo para dedicarse a la gestión completa del espacio social.

Resumo em Inglês:

Here we analyze Morel's theory of degeneration as it was presented in his Treatise of the degeneration of human species, published in 1857. This text originated as an attempt to answer difficulties that had to be faced by the nascent psychiatry. Following it, there began to be constructed an epistemological ground that made possible the creation and the later consolidation of an extended psychiatry, which still today seems to be obsessed about classifying the most varied behaviors as pathologies. The theory of degeneration creates a very wide explanatory frame for mental illness, in which the clear distinction between alienation and minor degenerations disappears and both are understood as physical or moral detours of an original type. From this time on, psychiatry transcends the walls of the asylum, to devote itself to the complete management of the social space.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Uno de los problemas más discutidos en la biología evolutiva es la identificación de los niveles sobre los que opera la selección natural. Usualmente se acepta que Darwin sostenía que la selección natural actúa a nivel del individuo. Sin embargo, otra línea de interpretación sugiere que Darwin concibió que la selección natural podía actuar a nivel de grupo, específicamente, que se vió obligado a sostener esto para explicar el comportamiento altruista. Este trabajo pretende mostrar que Darwin no esbozó un modelo claro de selección de grupo y que recurre a explicaciones de selección a nivel del individuo para dar cuenta del comportamiento altruísta. Defiendo esta lectura apelando a pasajes de su obra que considero que introducen la influencia del parentesco y la selección individual como fuerzas que explican el comportamiento altruista y que son la perspectiva desarrollada por los modelos actuales de aptitud inclusiva y altruismo recíproco.

Resumo em Inglês:

One of the most debated issues in evolutionary biology concerns the level at which natural selection operates. It is usually accepted that Darwin maintained that natural selection operates at the individual level. However, another line of interpretation suggests that Darwin conceived that natural selection could operate at the group level as well, specifically, that he was forced to accept this in order to explain the altruistic behavior. This paper aims to show that Darwin did not provide a clear model of group selection, and that he had recourse to explanations of selection at the individual level in order to explain altruistic behavior. I will defend this interpretation through passages in his texts that introduce the influence of parenthood and individual selection as forces that explain altruistic behavior and that appeal to the same points exploited by the contemporary models of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.